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September 10, 2016 Volume 10 Issue 17 Zoning Bulletin <br /> to challenge a zoning board's decision would add delay an expense to <br /> the zoning process and make "the statute so broad as to render it <br /> unworkable." <br /> The court rejected Killeskillen's argument. Looking at the plain <br /> language of the statute, the court found that the Legislature intended to <br /> create disjunctive classes of plaintiffs entitled to petition the circuit <br /> court: persons aggrieved by a board's decision or any taxpayer of the <br /> county. The court concluded that, under the plain language of SDCL <br /> 11-2-61, a taxpayer in the County could appeal the Board's decision. <br /> Accordingly,the court held that since Norris Patrick was a taxpayer in <br /> the County, he had standing under SDCL 11-2-61 to challenge the <br /> Board's grant of the CUP to Killeskillen here. <br /> As to the merits of the Petitioners' claim that the Board lacked juris- <br /> diction to grant Killeskillen the CUP because the governing Ordinances <br /> were invalid, the court said that depended on whether the County had <br /> validly adopted an ordinance designating the Board as the approving <br /> authority. The court remanded that issue to the circuit court to address. <br /> Case Note: <br /> In its decision, the court distinguished the requisite standing required under <br /> SDCL 7-8-27 fi-onz the standing required under SDCL 11-2-61. The former al- <br /> lows appeals from all decisions of the board of county commissioners "by ally <br /> person aggrieved upon filing a bond. . ."and identifies only one classification <br /> of"any person aggrieved.,"and the latter identifies two classifications of may <br /> person aggrieved or a taxpayer of the county. <br /> IL <br /> 4 ©2016 Thomson Reuters <br /> i <br /> �I <br /> p', <br />