Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/03/2016

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4 September 10, 2016 Volume 10 ( Issue 17 Zoning Bulletin legations against Longhi included: intentional fraudulent misrepresen- tation and intentional tortious interference with business expectancy. Longhi denied the allegations against her, and, among other things, she asserted the defense of absolute immunity. She argued that she was entitled to absolute immunity from any liability here because she was acting in an administrative capacity and performing a quasi-judicial function when she reviewed and voted on Villages' applications. She filed a motion with the court,asking it to either dismiss Villages' action against her or render summary judgment in her favor. Villages countered that Longhi was not protected under absolute immunity. Villages cited Connecticut statutory law—Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(c). Section 52-557n (c) provides members of municipal agencies with immunity but provides that such immunity"shall not ap- ply if such damage or injury was caused by the reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of such person." Villages therefore argued that Longhi was not entitled to immunity from suit since, as a member of the Commission that ultimately denied its applications, she had engaged in ex parte communications related to its applications. The trial court concluded that the Commission was acting in a quasi- judicial capacity when it considered Villages' applications and, therefore, its members—including Longhi—were protected by the liti- gation privilege, a subset of absolute immunity. The court reasoned that the role of zoning commission members when acting on permit ap- plications was similar to that of judges, and that absolute immunity furthered the public policy of encouraging participation and candor in such quasi-judicial proceedings. Villages appealed. DECISION: Judgment of trial court reversed. The Appellate Court of Connecticut disagreed with Longhi and the trial court that the common law litigation privilege subset of absolute immunity was applicable here. Although the appellate court agreed that the trial court had erred in dismissing the Villages' cause of action, the court clarified that it did not agree with Villages' assertion that the statute (?52-557n(c)) abrogated common law absolute immunity. Rather, the court only found that absolute immunity and the litigation privilege were not implicated by the allegations of Villages' complaint here. Instead, the court found that the statutory law § 52-557n(c), which afforded qualified immunity,rather than absolute immunity,was applicable here. In so holding,the court explained that Villages' claims and Longhi's defense involved"two distinct legal doctrines." Longhi's defense of absolute immunity applied to statements made during judicial or quasi- judicial proceedings, while Villages' claims that Longhi enjoyed only qualified immunity under § 52-557n(c) applied to the decision-making 10 ©2016 Thomson Reuters 4 I