Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/03/2016

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September 25, 2016 1 Volume 10 1 Issue 18 Zoning Bulletin 1 that the new zoning regulations "interfere[d] with his long-held development plans and reduce[d] the potential economic return on his property in [Town]." Among other things, the new zoning regulations increased the minimum lot size from one acre to two and increased the lot frontage requirement. Those changes reduced the number of lots into which Gould could subdivide his property. Eventually, Gould filed a declaratory judgment action against the Town. Gould sought to invalidate the UPD on the ground that it was enacted in violation of state statutory law-24 V.S.A. ch. 117. That statute provides, among other things,requirements regarding public hearings and adoptions of zoning bylaw amendments.More specifically,in his action,Gould alleged that the UPD was improperly enacted and therefore violated Gould's due process rights by infringing on a constitutionally protected interest. According to Gould, that constitutionally protected property interest was: "strict compli- ance with statutory procedures required in the adoption of zoning regulations." Gould also argued that he personally had a vested, constitutionally protected property interest in the prior zoning regulations (i.e., those in effect before adoption of the UPD)(the"1978 Regulations").With regard to the latter claim, Gould contended that he "took substantial action in developing his property and preparing for subdivision,in reliance on the 1978 Regulations" and also "relied on the statutory requirement that he would be provided sufficient no- tice before adoption of any amendment to the 1978 Regulation." In other words, Gould believed that his intentions and expectations to develop his property under the 1978 Regulations granted him a constitutionally protected property interest in doing so. The superior court held that there was "no constitutionally protected prop- erty interest in demanding compliance with"state-mandated ordinance adop- tion procedures. It also held that Gould had no vested rights to develop his property under the previous zoning regulations, and thus no property interest protected by procedural due process,because he had applied for a permit only after the UPD took effect. Gould appealed. I: DECISION:Affirmed. The Supreme Court of Vermont first held that Gould did not have a constitutionally protected due process property interest in the Town's strict compliance with the state statute concerning adoption of zoning ordinances (24 V.S.A,ch. 117). In so holding,the court explained that in order to maintain a procedural due process claim properly, Gould had to have alleged facts showing that the Town's action in adopting the new zoning regulations deprived Gould of a property interest protected by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.The 14th Amendment provides that no"State[shall]deprive any person of life,liberty, or property, without due process of law."(U.S. Const. amend.XIV, § 1.)Thus,here, said the court,Gould had to demonstrate"more than a mere expectation,"but rather that Town and state law"created a legiti- mate claim of entitlement to the property interest" of strict compliance with statutory procedures required in the adoption of zoning regulations. I; Importantly,the court noted that procedural due process requirements apply r, only with respect to governmental adjudicative decisions rather than legisla- 10 ©2016 Thomson Reuters i;