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Zoning Bulletin November 10, 2016 1 Volume 10 1 Issue 21 <br /> establish [that the ban] served a legitimate government interest and that the <br /> Ordinance was . . . narrowly drawn to advance that interest."In other words, <br /> the trial court found that the Ordinance's ban on digital billboards was "more <br /> expansive than necessary to advance the identified [Township] interests" of <br /> aesthetics and safety. <br /> The Township appealed and the Appellate Division reversed.The Appellate <br /> Division determined that the ban on digital billboards "passed constitutional <br /> muster."The Appellate Division determined that the Township's stated reasons <br /> for the digital billboard ban—aesthetics and safety—provided"a rational,objec- <br /> tive basis"for the ban and that the Ordinance's regulation of billboards was"no <br /> broader than necessary `to eliminate [the] heightened intrusive quality' of <br /> billboards." <br /> E&J petitioned the Supreme Court of New Jersey for certification, which <br /> the court granted. <br /> DECISION:Reversed. <br /> The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the Township's ordinance, <br /> prohibiting digital billboards throughout the township but permitting static <br /> billboards to be installed in a zoning district proximate to an interstate highway, <br /> violated the free speech provisions of the United States Constitution and the <br /> New Jersey Constitution. <br /> In so holding,the court first noted that"[r]egulations on billboards are justi- <br /> fied because `signs take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, <br /> displace alternative uses for land,and pose other problems that legitimately call <br /> for regulation.'"Still,explained the court,the First Amendment"protects com- <br /> mercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation." "The protection <br /> available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both,of the <br /> expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation,"said the <br /> court. <br /> Citing United States Supreme Court cases governing the standards of review <br /> on the validity of statutes regulating speech,the court held that"an ordinance or <br /> statute regulating signs, including billboards of any form, and affecting com- <br /> mercial as well as noncommercial speech should be examined in accordance <br /> with the Clark/Ward time, place, and manner standard" (as opposed to the <br /> Central Hudson (purely) commercial speech standard). Under the Clark/Ward <br /> time,place, and manner standard, explained the court, given E &J's constitu- <br /> tional challenge, the Ordinance here would be found to be constitutional if <br /> found to be: (1) content neutral (i.e., not favoring commercial over noncom- <br /> mercial speech); (2) narrowly tailored to serve a recognized and identified <br /> government interest(i.e.,does not burden speech more than necessary to further <br /> the government interest);and(3)reasonable alternative channels of communica- <br /> tion existed to disseminate the information sought to be distributed. <br /> Applying that test, the court found that the Ordinance here was content <br /> neutral since the Township ban on digital billboards addressed the "manner of 4 <br /> communication,not its content."However, the court also determined that the <br /> Ordinance's digital billboard ban was not narrowly tailored to serve the identi- <br /> lied Township interests of aesthetics and the safety of motorists. The court <br /> explained that an ordinance is considered to be narrowly.tailored"so long as the <br /> . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be <br /> ©2016 Thomson Reuters 7 <br /> 1 <br /> K <br /> I3 <br /> jF <br />