Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/02/2017

Home

December 10, 2016 I Volume 10 I Issue 23 Zoning Bulletin fornia Constitution, which prohibits a special purpose district from levying a general tax; and (3) the ordinance retaliated against landowners in the district who might in the future seek relief from the tax, because the ordinance improperly burdened their constitutional rights to petition the government and their statutory rights to seek relief through the courts. Finding no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court ruled that: (1) the tax complied with the Mello -Roos Act because the ser- vices it funded would augment, not supplant, the current services in the terri- tory; (2) the tax was a special tax, not a general tax; and (3) the ordinance was not unconstitutional. The Association appealed. DECISION: Judgment of Superior Court affirmed. Looking at the plain language of the Mello -Roos Act, the Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California, first held that the tax approved by Acre's developer to raise revenue to cover City services to the Acres Development complied with the Mello -Roos Act in that it provided for "additional services" to meet an increased demand for existing services resulting from the Acres Development. The Act provided that a tax was permitted to finance services only to the extent that they were "in addition" to those previously provided in the territory of the community facilities district. Moreover, as a matter of first impression (i.e., the first time the court ad- dressed the issue), the court further held that, under the Mello -Roos Act, taxes approved by landowner votes could be used to fund an increased demand for existing services. The court explained that such services would be in addition to services provided in the area of the district before the district was created, and services that met increased demand would not supplant services available in the area of the district when the district was created because they would not replace those services. The court also held that the tax approved by Acre's developer to raise reve- nue to cover City services to the Acres Development was a special tax, rather than a general tax, and thus did not violate the California Constitution. The court explained that under the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XIII C § 2, subd. (a)), a "special purpose district" has no power to levy general taxes." The court assumed, without deciding, that the community facilities district at issue here was a "special purpose district," and therefore was prohibited from levying general taxes. The court also explained the distinction made under the California Constitution between a "general tax" and a "special tax." A "gen- eral tax" is defined as "any tax imposed for general governmental purposes." A "special tax" is defined as "any tax imposed for specific purposes, including a tax imposed for specific purposes, which is placed into a general fund." (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subds. (a) & (d).) In finding the tax here was a special tax, the court noted: the tax would not be deposited into general funds; proceeds from the tax would not indirectly raise revenue that would be avail- able for any and all governmental purposes; and the tax revenue would not cover existing costs that were previously paid from the general fund, but rather would cover new costs resulting from increased demand for facilities and ad- ditional services resulting from the Acres Development. 4 © 2016 Thomson Reuters