Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/02/2017

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Zoning Bulletin December 25, 2016 I Volume 10 I Issue 24 the history of the Act, and prior interpretations of the Act, the court concluded that § 5270 of the Act must be interpreted not to preempt lo- cal ordinances. Recognizing that interpretation gave "little effect" to § 5270's exclusivity provision, the court said it was not the court that limited the exclusivity provision, but it was the Legislature that had "expanded and made clear the authorities of counties to regulate billboards within its boundaries, including in unincorporated areas." Finally, with specific regard to the D'Egidios' billboard, the court noted: "The Act specifically provides that when the use of a billboard is modified after it was erected in a manner that causes it to become ille- gal under state or local ordinances, the billboard no longer is `lawfully erected.' " (§ 5216.1.) Therefore, the court concluded that "the trial court did not err in finding that, as of the change in use of the billboard in 1987, the billboard was not lawfully erected," and was therefore unlawful under the City's municipal code. See also: Viacom Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Arcata, 140 Cal. App. 4th 230, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300 (1st Dist. 2006). Case Note: The D 'Egidios had also contended that the doctrines of estoppel or laches ap- plied because the City's 17-year delay in enforcing the billboard as illegal "caused them prejudice." The court rejected this argument, finding the D'Egidios failed to show prejudice as a result of the City's inaction in that the D 'Egidios failed to show evidence that they relied upon the City's inaction to their detriment. The only injury that the D'Egidios' alleged was loss of income they would earn from the billboard. The court found that injury was not caused by the D'Egidios' reliance on the City's inaction but was caused by the fact that their billboard was not lawfully erected and was therefore a public nuisance. © 2016 Thomson Reuters 7