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December 25, 2016 I Volume 10 I Issue 24 Zoning Bulletin <br />such as: the municipality's population density data; the municipality's <br />percentage of total undeveloped land; and the municipality's percent- <br />age of its land available for the class of housing alleged to be unconsti- <br />tutionally constrained. Third, if it is determined that the community is <br />situated in the path of population expansion and is not already highly <br />developed, then the courts, in the final stage of the analysis, ask whether <br />the municipality has provided for its "fair share" of land for the class of <br />housing under consideration. <br />The Developers had produced evidence demonstrating that the land <br />zoned for development of apartments within the Township was inade- <br />quate to support the Township's "fair share" of apartments given the <br />Ordinance's restrictions that made apartment construction "economi- <br />cally infeasible" —such as minimum acreage requirements, and com- <br />mon open space requirements. The court said that "[w]here a de facto <br />challenge is brought against an ordinance based upon economic <br />infeasibility rather than a township's failure to account for its fair share <br />of housing, the evidence must account for basic legal principles govern- <br />ing exclusionary challenges." The court explained: <br />First, an ordinance may regulate the type and configuration of a use once <br />it has provided for that use; limitations on the level of density permitted <br />for the use, standing alone, do not establish that the ordinance land has <br />been saturated by other uses. Second, where an ordinance has zoned suf- <br />ficient land for a use but that land has been saturated by other uses, the <br />inability to develop land does not amount to an unconstitutional prohibi- <br />tion of the use. Third, an ordinance will not be found unconstitutional <br />merely because it deprives the owner of the most lucrative and profitable <br />uses; as long as the property in question may be reasonably used for the <br />purposes permitted under the ordinance, the owner may not legally <br />complain. Finally, the fact that an ordinance applies a significant amount <br />of restrictions to development of a particular use, standing alone, is insuf- <br />ficient to show that the ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable and lacking a <br />substantial relationship to the public health, safety and welfare; instead, <br />evidence must be produced to demonstrate that the restrictions lack a le- <br />gitimate purpose. <br />Applying that analysis here, the court found that the evidence pre- <br />sented by the Developers "failed to distinguish between the provision <br />of a use and the provision for a host of variations on the configuration <br />of that use, failed to show that any lack of development of the apart- <br />ment use within the Township was due to the Ordinance rather than the <br />development of other uses where apartments were permitted, and failed <br />to demonstrate that the Ordinance rendered development of apartments <br />within the Township infeasible rather than simply prevented develop- <br />ment of apartments in a manner that would provide [the Developers] <br />with the most profitable use of land." Most importantly, found the court, <br />the Developers failed to demonstrate that the restrictions placed on the <br />development of apartments within the Township's MDR and Multi- <br />10 © 2016 Thomson Reuters <br />