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<br />September 10,2004 - Page 7 <br /> <br />Z.B. <br /> <br />First, it was facially invalid because it was dated Jan. 22, 2002, despite the <br />fact the board did not vote on the application until Feb. 26, 2002. <br />Second, the factual findings set forth in a resolution had to be more than a <br />mere recital of testimony or conclusory statemehts. Rather, the resolution had <br />to contain sufficient findings, based on the proofs submitted, to satisfy a re- <br />Iflewing coun the board had analyzed the variance request in accordance with <br />the law and in light of the master plan and zoning ordinances. <br />The board's resolution set forth no factual findings. It merely identified the <br />~lpplic:lnt: described the proposed site; summarized, in a very cursory fashion, <br />the testimony presented by New York SMSA's witnesses; and reiterated se- <br />lected board member and public comments. Its sole conclusory statement was <br />coucbed in statutory language and lacked any reference to specific facts and <br />circumstances surrounding the application. <br />While individual board member remarks made during the course of hearings <br />could be useful in interpreting ambiguous language in a resolution, they were not a <br />substimte for tbe formality mandated by state law. Such remarks mainly reflected <br />the beliefs of the speaker and could not be assumed to represent the findings of an <br />entire board. Because such remarks represented infOlmal verbalizations of the <br />speaker's transitory thoughts, they could not be equated to deliberative findings <br />of LlCt. Ultimately, it was the resolution, and not the board members' delibera- <br />tions, tbat had to provide the legally required findings of facts and conclusions. <br />see also: ,Hedical Cemer at Princeton v. Princeton Zoning Board ofAdjustn.1ent, <br />778 A.2d 482 (2001). <br />see also: Smith v. Fair Haven Zoning Board ofAdjusmzem, 761 A.2d 111 (2000). <br /> <br />Appeal- Landowner sues over plam:llng diredor's code interpretation <br />F ails to utilize administrative appeals process <br />Citm/on: Regan v. Kootenai Coumy, Supreme Court of Idaho, No. 29737 (2004) <br />IDAHO (07/01/04) - Regan received a site disturbance permit from Kootenai <br />Cuunty allowing for the grading of an existing road. Regan resurfaced the road <br />and converted portions of it for use as a private airstrip for himself and his <br />in 'fitees on <1 noncommercial basis. <br />In a July 20. 1999 letter, a planning director with the Kootenai County Plan- <br />l1in~ Depanment informed Regan his airstrip was 3. prohibited use because it <br />W:l:) not speClfic;l11y iisT.ed JS a permitted or conditional use in the district. <br />R;:;~an :luee!. lrguing his airLeld was legal because the ordinance did Dot <br />::ddres:; noncomrne::cial Jirstrips at all. The coun ruled in favor of the county. <br />!ij)dtn~ the zODlilg.::oc:e in fJC banned <111 airstrips in [he district built after 1973. <br />2c:;~H1 JppeJieG. ~lrgt,ing the ;:;ourt' smterpretarion was flawed. <br /> <br />DECISION: Reversi::d. <br /> <br />~~.~.~~ln ,~,)ulJ ;:U[ ~Jr:n.5 ~Jl~ ;2[)rnpLll111 [c court. <br /> <br />~ . <br />1.__OQSc:JuenCl-':';. [nc COUII <br /> <br />'.2; ~;-':C,J. :ulol;:.n ::'.;oll~\Hnq ~~;"(:uo. .--'.,il'.' '2GrGcuc~iGn So -;)i'GOICilG.J. ::sr,:iGre :nformatlon :JieaS6 ::2.1\ 6-; -, :J.'Z.,)OdC. <br /> <br />111 <br />