Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/06/2017

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February 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 4 Zoning Bulletin NPDES permitting program. More specifically, the Board concluded that storm water regulations required under the 2013 Phase I Permit are not "land use control ordinances" governed by Washington's vesting statutes. The Counties appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. It found that the vested rights doc- trine excuses compliance with the storm water regulations because those regulations are "land use control ordinances." The Department (as well as several environmental groups, which had intervened) appealed. DECISION: Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the storm water regula- tions that permittees were required to implement and apply to com- pleted development applications as part of the NPDES permitting program (pursuant to the 2013 Phase I Permit) were not "land use control ordinances" subject to Washington's vesting statutes. In so holding, the court explained that the vesting statutes apply only to "land use control ordinances."" (See RCW 19.27.095(1); RCW 58.17.033(1)). The court concluded that the storm water regulations that municipal storm water permittees were required to implement and apply to completed development applications as part of the NPDES permitting program were not "land use control ordinances" subject to the vesting statutes. Looking at "the legislative history and the purpose of the vesting statutes, as well as [court] precedent," the court found that the vested rights doctrine "grew out of a concern that municipali- ties were abusing their discretion with respect to land use and zoning rules." Thus, the vesting statutes were intended to restrict municipal discretion with respect to local land use ordinances. Here, however, the storm water regulations were mandatory state regulations, rather than discretionary local regulations. In other words, the court found that the vested rights doctrine places limits on municipal discretion, and found that with mandates of federal and state environmental laws there was no "local" in the sense that municipalities had discretion to decide whether applicants must comply. (The only local discretion with regard to such environmental laws, found the court, was to include those mandates in a local ordinance.) See also: State ex rel. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. 2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954). See also: West Main Associates v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720 P.2d 782 (1986). Case Note: The holding in this case disapproved of Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wash. 4 © 2017 Thomson Reuters