Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/06/2017

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Zoning Bulletin February 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 4 While the lawsuit was pending, Lemont approved the zoning reclas- sification for the Property (but made no other determination as to the development application for the Property). Lemont continued to maintain that Willow Springs' action should be dismissed because Wil- low Springs lacked standing. The circuit court agreed with Lemont. It held that Willow Springs lacked standing to challenge the rezoning of the Property. It also held that Willow Springs lacked standing to contest the development ap- plication at this time. Willow Springs appealed. DECISION: Judgment of circuit court affirmed. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division, agreed with Lemont and the circuit court that Willow Springs lacked standing to challenge the zoning reclassification of the Property. The court fur- ther concluded that dismissal of Willow Springs' claim in its entirety was proper because, since there had been no approval yet of the proposed development for the Property, there was no government ac- tion that could properly be challenged other than the zoning reclassification. In so holding, the court explained that a municipality's standing to bring a constitutional challenge on another municipality's zoning ordinance, as Willow Springs had here, required "a clear demonstration that [the challenging municipality] would be substantially, directly and adversely affected in its corporate capacity." In other words, Willow Springs had to show an injury that was "(a) distinct and palpable, (b) fairly traceable to the [Lemont's] actions, and (c) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief." The court found that Lemont had submitted evidence that Willow Springs would not be adversely affected by the zoning reclassification since industrial use of the Property was "compatible with surrounding land uses." Lemont had offered evidence that the Property: had previ- ously been zoned for industrial use; was to be "industrial" under the Lemont 2030 Comprehensive Plan; was currently being used for a "[flunk yard, home/office, truck parking, billboards"; and the surround- ing property consisted of either unincorporated county land, forest preserve/public land, or land zoned for industrial or intensive industrial use. In other words, the court found that Lemont presented evidence that the zoning reclassification did not represent any change to the status quo but rather was in line with both the the current use of the property and the zoning prior to annexation. The court found that this indicated that there would be no "harm" to Willow Springs with the zoning reclassification for the Property. Since Lemont had presented such evidence, the court found the burden shifted_to Willow Springs to demonstrate some adverse affect © 2017 Thomson Reuters 7