Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/04/2017

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Zoning Bulletin March 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 6 ized outdoor sports, leisure -time activities, and other customary and usual recreational activities, excluding boat launching facilities, amusement parks, and campgrounds." The Estate argued that since "outdoor recreational facili- ties" were not permitted in the LDR, while "municipal uses" were permitted in the LDR, the Town's proposed use could not be harmonized under both cat- egories of uses and must therefore be found to be an "outdoor recreational fa- cility" and thus prohibited in the LDR zone. DECISION: Judgment of Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that, under the "clear and unambiguous" language of the Town's zoning ordinance, the Town's proposed use of the Property was a "municipal use," and was thus permitted in the LDR zone. In fact, looking at the language of the Town's zoning ordinance, the court found that "any use" by the Town would qualify as a "municipal use." There were "no carveouts or exceptions." Therefore, even though some uses that are "municipal" might be defined elsewhere in the ordinance, they would still qualify as "municipal uses." "[L]imiting permissible `municipal uses' in the LDR zone to only those uses that are otherwise explicitly permitted within the zone," as the Estate had argued, would require the court to have to read ad- ditional language into the ordinance's provisions —which it could not do — explained the court. Special Exception —Opponents of proposed fuel station/convenience store contend zoning board improperly evaluated special exception application Opponents dispute both extent neighborhood must be defined and burden of proof of parties Citation: Attar v. DMS Tollgate, LLC, 2017 WL 366341 (Md. 2017) MARYLAND (01/23/17)—This case addressed the issue of whether and to what extent the boundaries of the neighborhood in which a proposed special exception use is to be located must be defined before the special exception can be approved. The case also addressed the extent of any burden of proof that opponents to a special exception must meet. The Background/Facts: William and Mary Goff, along with DMS Tollgate, LLC, (collectively, the "Applicants") sought to operate a fuel service station with a convenience store ("Wawa") on property (the "Property") lo- cated in Baltimore County (the "County"). In furtherance of that, the Ap- plicants applied to the County for a Special Exception. Under the County Zon- ing Regulations § 502.1(A), a special exception use is prohibited if it is: "detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of the locality involved;" and "tend[s] to create congestion in roads, streets or alleys therein[.]" © 2017 Thomson Reuters 9