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Zoning Bulletin April 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 8 <br />even if the local ordinance does not so provide. It also addressed <br />whether local ordinances can create means of zoning appeal to the <br />superior court that are not authorized by state statute. <br />The Background/Facts: Kerley Family Homes ("Kerley") was <br />building townhouses on property it owned in the City of Cumming (the <br />"City"). Apparently based on a surveyor mistake, Kerley discovered <br />that it was constructing buildings closer to adjoining property than the <br />City's Zoning Ordinance setback permitted. Kerley filed a variance ap- <br />plication to change the required setback for some of the buildings on its <br />property. After the City's Planning Board denied the variance applica- <br />tion, the City's Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") granted it with sev- <br />eral conditions. <br />Thereafter, neighboring homeowners (the "Homeowners") appealed <br />the grant of the variance to superior court. The Homeowners complaint <br />requested a writ of mandamus to compel the BZA "to comply with the <br />law." The City, joined by Kerley (collectively, the "Defendants"), filed <br />a motion to dismiss the Homeowners' complaint. The Defendants <br />argued that the Homeowner's challenge to the variance decision was <br />required under state statutory law—OCGA § 5-4-1—to come to the <br />superior court by a petition for certiorari. Thus, the Defendants argued <br />that since the Homeowners' action should be dismissed because the <br />Homeowners erred in brining the challenge by a writ of mandamus. <br />OCGA § 5-4-1(a) provides that "[t]he writ of certiorari shall lie for <br />the correction of errors committed by any inferior judicatory or any <br />person exercising judicial powers, including the judge of the probate <br />court, except in cases touching the probate of wills, granting letters <br />testamentary, and of administration." Thus, "[c]ertiorari is not an ap- <br />propriate remedy to review or obtain relief from the judgment, decision <br />or action of an inferior judicatory or body rendered in the exercise of <br />legislative, executive, or ministerial functions, as opposed to judicial or <br />quasi-judicial powers." <br />The parties agreed to treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for <br />summary judgment, and the superior court ultimately denied the sum- <br />mary judgment. In ruling that the Homeowners could proceed on their <br />petition for mandamus, the superior court relied on the procedural <br />direction of the Supreme Court of Georgia, which had, in prior case <br />law, provided that "where the zoning ordinance does not provide a <br />means of appeal from the denial of a request for a variance, the land- <br />owner travels to superior court by writ of mandamus" (the "local - <br />ordinance requirement"). <br />The Defendants appealed. They argued that "the local -ordinance <br />requirement" was unfounded and asked the appeals court to "disap- <br />prove" it. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Georgia. <br />DECISION: Judgment of Superior Court reversed. <br />© 2017 Thomson Reuters 3 <br />