Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/01/2017

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May 10, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 9 Zoning Bulletin Waterman and the Town Commissioners disagreed. They argued that, in this context, the County Commissioners' sole source of authority to act was LG § 4-416, which was a public general law. Thus, they contended, Resolution 14-33 could not be a public local law under the Maryland Constitution. Pointing out that LG § 4-416 did not contain an express right to rescind and relying on language in the statute providing that, once waiver has been granted, the Town Commissioners have "exclusive jurisdiction" over zoning, Waterman and the Town Commis- sioners argued that the plain language of the statute prohibited the re- scission of Resolution 14-31. The County Commissioners and QACA countered, arguing that both Resolutions were public local laws, not public general laws. They contended that LG § 4-416 could not restrict the County's power under the Maryland Constitution to repeal a public local law like Resolution 14-31. Further, they argued that,•even absent an express power to re- scind a resolution, the County Commissioners had the inherent power to do so. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that the County Commission- ers "had no authority to repeal and rescind Resolution 14-31." Finding there were no issues of material fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Waterman and the Town Commissioners. The County Commissioners and QACA appealed (though, subse- quently, the County Commissioners dismissed their appeal). DECISION: Judgment of Circuit Court reversed. Agreeing with QACA, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that Resolutions 14-31 and 14-33 were public local laws (rather than public general laws), adopted pursuant to Article XI-F, Section 6 of the Maryland Constitution, and subject to rescission. In so holding, the court discussed the process of determining whether a law is general or local. The court explained that "[t]he classification of legislative action as general or local is based on `subject matter and substance and not merely on form,' . . . and is determined by applying `settled legal principles to the facts of particular cases.' " "Enactments that apply to a single subdivision of the state regarding a subject of lo- cal import are considered local laws," said the court. Comparatively, "[e]ven an enactment that appears local in nature is a general law if it affects the interests of more than one geographical subdivision or the entire state." Here, the court found that both Resolutions applied to the Wheatlands Farm property that was located "within a single subdivision of the state," and had "no consequence on any land outside of [the County]" and was a "matter of purely local import." Finding the Resolutions were public local laws (and not public general laws), the court agreed with 8 © 2017 Thomson Reuters