|
Zoning Bulletin October 10, 2017 I Volume 11.1 Issue 19
<br />Article V, Section 501 of the Ordinance defined "land uses permit-
<br />ted" in a County agricultural district ("A-1") as including: the "[b]reed-
<br />ing, raising, and feeding of livestock (i.e. horses, cattle, sheep, goats,
<br />mules, pigs, etc.) . . . ;" and the "[b]reeding, raising and feeding of
<br />chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese, or other fowl[.]" Article V, Section 601
<br />of the Ordinance defined "land uses permitted" in a County R-1 district
<br />as including: the "[b]reeding, raising, and feeding of grazing livestock
<br />(i.e. horses, cattle, sheep, goats, mules, etc.) . . .."
<br />Hatfield contended that, by not exclusively defining "livestock" or
<br />"grazing livestock," Section 601 could be interpreted to include poultry,
<br />fowl, and/or birds. He argued that Section 601 was "unconstitutionally
<br />vague" and lacked "clear notice and sufficiently definite warning of that
<br />which is prohibited."
<br />Sitting as an appellate court, the circuit judge found the Board's deci-
<br />sion was "fairly debatable, supported by substantial evidence, and not
<br />arbitrary or capricious."
<br />Hatfield appealed.
<br />DECISION: Judgment of Circuit Court affirmed.
<br />The Supreme Court of Mississippi concluded that "[t]he Board's in-
<br />terpretation and decision, finding that Hatfield violated Section 601 by
<br />keeping or raising fowl on his R-1 zoned property, was reasonable and
<br />not arbitrary or capricious." The court also concluded that the Board's
<br />decision "was also, at a minimum, fairly debatable." Further, the court
<br />held that, "when read in light of the entire . . . Ordinance," Section 601
<br />"gave Hatfield sufficient notice that keeping or raising fowl on his prop-
<br />erty was prohibited."
<br />In so concluding and holding, the court explained that "[z]oning ordi-
<br />nances should be given a fair and reasonable construction, in the light
<br />of their terminology, the objects sought to be obtained, the natural
<br />import of the words used in common and accepted usage, the setting in
<br />which they are employed, and the general structure of the zoning
<br />ordinance as a whole." "[I]n construing a zoning ordinance," said the
<br />court, "great weight should be given to the construction placed upon the
<br />words by the local authorities," although "courts are certainly not bound
<br />by a board's interpretation of a local ordinance if it is `manifestly
<br />unreasonable.' " Further, explained the court, a court will affirm a
<br />board's zoning decision unless it is clearly "arbitrary, capricious,
<br />discriminatory, illegal, or without [a] substantial evidentiary basis." If a
<br />board's zoning decision is "fairly debatable[,]" the court will not re-
<br />verse it,
<br />With those standards in mind, the court found that the Ordinance was
<br />not "unconstitutionally vague," but rather "clearly define[d] the permit-
<br />ted uses" for A-1 and R-1 districts. While A-1 zoning included the
<br />permitted use of breeding, raising, and feeding chickens, ducks, or other
<br />© 2017 Thomson Reuters 7
<br />
|