Agenda - Planning Commission - 12/07/2017

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October 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 20 Zoning Bulletin ten order, requirement, decision or determination where the person ag- grieved has materially changed his position in good faith reliance on the action of the zoning administrator or other administrative officer unless it is proven that such written order, requirement, decision or determination was obtained through malfeasance of the zoning administrator or other administrative officer or through fraud . . .." The Rhoadses contended that they had a vested right to their Garage use because they had: received a Certificate from Quicke, more than 60 days prior to the Notice of zoning violation, and that they had relied upon the Certificate in building the Garage. The BZA denied the Rhoadses' appeal, and affirmed Quesenberry's decision that the Garage violated the Ordinance. The Rhoadses appealed to the County Circuit Court. The County Board of Supervisors (the "Board") filed an answer to the Rhoadses' ap- peal, and also asked the court to declare that the Garage was in violation of the Ordinance. The Circuit Court held that, under Code § 15.2-2311(C), the Rhoadses had a vested right to the Garage use. The Board appealed. DECISION: Judgment of Circuit Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that, under Code § 15.2-2311(C), the Rhoadses' right to build the Garage vested 60 days after Quicke had issued the Certificate approving their Application. In so holding, the court noted that, by its plain terms, the prerequisites for Code § 15.2-2311(C) to apply are: (1) a "written order, requirement, decision or determination made by the zoning administrator;" (2) the passage of at least 60 days from the zoning administrator's determina- tion; and (3) a material change in position "in good faith reliance on the action of the zoning administrator." Two of those prerequisites were not in dispute: It was agreed that more than 60 days had elapsed between Quicke's initial approval of the Garage and his successor's later asser- tion of a zoning violation. It was also undisputed that the Rhoadses materially changed their position in good faith reliance on Quicke's Certificate, as they built the Garage at a cost of nearly $27,000. The Board argued, however, that a third prerequisite was missing, and therefore that Code § 15.2-2311(C) did not apply to vest the Rhoadses' right to the Garage construction. The Board argued that: (1) Quicke "lacked the authority to approve a plain violation of the Zoning Ordinance, and the Certificate he issued was therefore void ab initio;" and (2) the Certificate issued by Quicke was not a "determination" within the meaning of the statute. Additionally, the Board asserted that Code § 15.2-2311(C) only applied to bar the' subsequent actions of a zoning administrator or other administrative officer, and not those of any other body, such as the Board or a court. 4 © 2017 Thomson Reuters