Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/02/2017

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September 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 18 Zoning Bulletin Plaintiffs had shown that: the spacing rule was not adopted out of concern for the disabled; and the spacing rule placed restriction on where disabled residents could live. The court explained the relevant law: Under the FHA, it is unlawful to "discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap" of a person who intends to reside in the dwelling. (42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f)(1).) Under the FHA, it is also unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in con- nection with such dwelling, because of a handicap" of any person who intends to reside in the dwelling after it is made available. (42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(f)(2).) Of particular relevance here, courts have found that the FHA "appl[ies] to municipal zoning ordinances that would restrict the placement of group homes." Specifically, Illinois federal district courts have found that: "[t]he FHA is violated when `different standards apply to group homes than to families and other groups living together;' " and the provisions of alleged discriminatory ordinances "cannot survive unless they are warranted by the specific needs and abilities of those handicapped persons to whom they apply." Here, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Code's spacing rule, on its face, applied only to residences for the disabled and imposed a condition on those residences that was not imposed on similar residences for persons without disabilities. The court agreed. The ,court found that the language of the Code would allow "five unrelated college students" to live together in a residential area without being subject to any condi- tions, while prohibiting such an equal opportunity for disabled adults. The court also concluded that, in adopting the spacing rule, it was not the interests of the disabled that were considered, but rather was an at- tempt to protect residential environments from the adverse effects of homes for the disabled. The court also concluded that the Plaintiffs had established a likeli- hood of success on the merits of showing that the City's refusal to grant the Plaintiff's CPU application violated the FHA's reasonable accom- modation provision. The court explained that the FHA also requires "a public entity to reasonably accommodate a disabled person by making changes in rules, policies, practices or services as is necessary to provide that person with access to housing that is equal to that of those who are not disabled." The court noted that an accommodation is required under the FHA if it "(1) is reasonable, and (2) necessary, (3) to afford a handicapped person the equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." Here, the court found that the City failed to ever specifically address or evaluate the Plaintiff's request for a reasonable accommodation 8 © 2017 Thomson Reuters