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Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/07/2017
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Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/07/2017
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Planning Commission
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09/07/2017
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August 10, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 15 Zoning Bulletin <br />The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu- <br />tion provides that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without <br />just compensation." The Takings Clause is made applicable to the States <br />through the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, the Takings Clause requires <br />private property owners be compensated when their property is acquired by <br />the government for a public purpose. Courts have also recognized that govern- <br />ment regulation may be so onerous as to constitute a taking, such as: when a <br />regulation "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land;" and <br />when a regulation "impedes the use of property without depriving the owner <br />of all economically beneficial use." Still, courts recognize that "[t]he complete <br />deprivation of use will not require compensation if the challenged limitations <br />`inhere . . . in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of <br />property and nuisance already placed upon land ownership.' " <br />Here, the Murrs contended that the state and county regulations deprived <br />them of all economically beneficial or productive use of Lot E, which they <br />submitted was appraised at a value of $40,000. <br />The State of Wisconsin ("Wisconsin") and St. Croix County (the "County") <br />(hereinafter, collectively, the "Respondents") countered that in looking at the <br />issue of whether there was a regulatory taking here, the two lots had to be <br />considered as a single whole lot due to their merger under the regulations. <br />Respondents submitted appraisal values of: $698,300 for the two lots together <br />as regulated, and $771,000 for the lots as two distinct buildable properties; <br />and $373,000 for Lot F as a single lot with improvements. <br />Finding there were no issues of material fact in dispute, and deciding the <br />matter on the law alone, the County Circuit Court granted summary judgment <br />to the Respondents. The court found that the relevant regulations did not con- <br />stitute a regulatory taking because the Murrs could still build a new cabin on <br />either lot or across both. The court also found that the Murrs had not been <br />deprived of all economic value of their property, because the decrease in mar- <br />ket value of the unified lots as compared to the lots had they been distinct <br />buildable properties was less than 10 percent (e.g., $771,000 vs. $698,300). <br />The Murrs appealed. The State Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held <br />that the regulatory takings analysis properly focused on Lots E and F together <br />and that, using that framework, the merger regulations did not effect a taking. <br />The Murrs again appealed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied <br />discretionary review. The Supreme Court of the United States granted <br />certiorari. <br />DECISION: Judgment of Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. <br />The Supreme Court of the United States held that the state and county <br />regulations challenged by the Murrs did not work a regulatory taking on the <br />Murrs. <br />The Court explained that because a test for regulatory taking requires a <br />court to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the <br />value that remains in the property, the court must, critically, determine how to <br />define the unit of property "whose value is to furnish the denominator of the <br />fraction." Again, here, the Murrs had argued that the "denominator" was Lot <br />E, such that with the value of Lot E as both the numerator and denominator- <br />4 ©2017 Thomson Reuters <br />
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