Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/04/2018

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December 25, 2017 I Volume 11 I Issue 24 Zoning Bulletin Edwardses' properties to an R-MH zoning designation, which allowed mobile home uses. In 2008, the City amended the BEOD Ordinance by replacing a table, and in doing so, stated that "mobile home parks or courts" and "related structures" were prohibited in the BEOD Ordinance. In February 2009, the City notified the Edwardses that even though the underlying R-MH zoning of their properties allowed mobile homes, the BEOD took precedence and did not allow them. In August 2011, the Edwardses asked the City to allow them to: (1) upgrade a mobile home on one of the 1973 lots; and (2) to put additional mobile homes on the 1997 lots. The City denied those requests. The Edwardses then appealed the City's denial of their requests. Among other things, the Edwardses argued that the City's denial of their requests were improper because the BEOD Ordinance was "unconstitutionally vague and overbroad" as applied to them. They also argued that the denial unconstitution- ally violated their vested rights to use the properties for mobile homes. Finding no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter based on the law alone, the superior court granted summary judgment on the Edwardses' claims in favor of the City. The Edwardses appealed. On appeal, they again argued that the term "mobile home court or park" in the 2008 BEOD Ordinance amendment was "unconstitutionally vague" and that it was unclear if the BEOD Ordinance precluded them from placing additional mobile homes on their properties. In the alternative, they argued that even if it was clear that a large group of re- lated mobile homes would qualify as a "mobile home park or court," the BEOD Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it was "not clear whether this language prohibits the placement of a single mobile home in the BEOD area." Further, the Edwardses argued that the BEOD Ordinance unconstitutionally hampered the use of their properties by violating their vested rights to use the properties for mobile homes. DECISION: Judgment of district court superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the BEOD Ordinance term "mobile home park or court" was not, as the Edwardses had argued, unconsti- tutionally vague as applied. The court explained that the BEOD Ordinance would be void if it was "so vague that persons of `common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' " Here, the court found that persons of common intelligence would understand that the term "mobile home park or court" encompassed the kind of aggregation of commonly owned mobile homes that the Edwardses had or had sought. Indeed, the court noted that the Edwardses had explained that they wanted to develop a "manufactured home park" or a "mobile home park" on their properties. Ac- cordingly, the court concluded that the BEOD Ordinance was not vague as ap- plied to Appellants' situation. As to the Edwardses' argument that the BEOD Ordinance was vague as to the placement of a single mobile home in the BEOD area, the court would not address that issue since the Edwardses were "not in that situation" and thus lacked standing (i.e., the legal right) to raise that argument. 8 ©2017 Thomson Reuters