Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/01/2018

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January 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 1 Zoning Bulletin In so concluding, the court first held that RCW 9.41.290 did not ap- ply here because KCC 10.25 was not a firearms regulation. The court reached this finding based on several supporting factors. First, the court noted that RCW 9.41.290 did not make any reference to the regulation of shooting facilities, and thus, the court concluded that there was no indication that the legislature intended to preempt local ordinances requiring shooting facilities to obtain operating permits. Second, the court noted that KCC 10.25 did not expressly regulate the discharge of fireainis (or a person's ability to discharge a firearm), but only regulated "shooting facilities." Third, the court noted that RCW 9.41.290 expressly acknowledged that local governments may enact laws and ordinances relating to firearms as long as they are "authorized by state law . . . and consistent with this chapter." The court found that KCC 10.25's requirement that a shooting facility obtain an operating permit was "an exercise of the County's police power that [was] authorized under state law." Fourth, the court noted that state supreme court cases addressing RCW 9.41.290 had "limited the scope of preemption" and what was viewed as a "firearms regulation." Moreover, the court held that even if RCW 9.41.290 did apply, KCC 10.25 fell within the exception to preemption in RCW 9.41.300(2)(a), which allowed for local regulation. of the discharge of firearms "where there is a likelihood that humans, domestic animals, or property will be jeopardized." Looking at the stated purposes for adoption of KCC 10.25, the court found that it was "enacted to address the reasonable likelihood that the operation of shooting ranges would jeopardize humans and property," and thus fell within the exception to preemption in RCW 9.41.200(2)(a). Finally, the court also concluded that KCC 10.25 did not violate the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, or Article 1, sec- tion. 24 of the Washington Constitution. The court explained that for Second Amendment challenges, courts must: (1) determine whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amend- ment; and if so, (2) then apply the appropriate level of scrutiny. Here, finding that the County presented no significant argument on whether KCC 10.25 implicated the Second Amendment, the court assumed, without deciding, that it did. Next, finding the Ninth Circuit and "a ma- jority of other circuit courts" applied "intermediate scrutiny" to fire- arms regulation, the court here did so as well. The court explained that a law survives intermediate scrutiny "if it is substantially related to an important government purpose." Here, the court found that the County had an important government interest in public safety —"ensuring that shooting facilities do not endanger people or property." And, the court found that KCC 10.25 substantially related to that interest, as the permit required facilities to meet certain standards involving safety issues. Ac- cordingly, the court concluded that KCC 10.25 did not violate the Second Amendment. 4 © 2018 Thomson Reuters