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Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/01/2018
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Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/01/2018
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Planning Commission
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02/01/2018
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Zoning Bulletin January 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 1 <br />an application to the aldermen, who serve essentially as a "local board," <br />"a review procedure, and the issuance of an authorization that affects <br />the way that land may be used, similar to the process for seeking G.L. <br />c. 40B approval." The court, however, found it "clear" that "the alder- <br />man's allowance of prior amendments to the restrictive covenants were <br />not the functional equivalent of permits or approvals" because: "the al- <br />dermen were not sitting as a local permitting authority when allowing <br />the amendments pursuant to G.L. c. 40, § 3, and the amendments, <br />which affected a real property interest held by the [C]ity, were not the <br />same types of permissions as regulations concerning `building con- <br />struction and design, siting, zoning, health, safety, [or] environment.' " <br />Moreover, rejecting Wells' argument that a negative easement was <br />"somehow qualitatively different from a positive easement in teiius of <br />ownership rights," the court stated that "both affirmative and negative <br />easements are to be treated, equally, as easements." <br />Further, rejecting Wells' suggestion that the deed restrictions were <br />not, in fact, a legitimate property interest, but, rather, merely zoning <br />restrictions, the court stated that "[d]espite their similarity to zoning <br />provision, the deed restrictions are a property interest, a restrictive cov- <br />enant on land, that [could] not be abrogated any any act by a zoning <br />board." <br />See also: Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Groton v. Housing Appeals Com- <br />mittee, 451 Mass. 35, 883 N.E.2d 899 (2008). <br />Case Note: <br />Wells had also presented an alternative argument that the restrictive covenant <br />was invalid because the nature of the property had changed such that the cov- <br />enant no longer provided the benefit intended when it was purchased. The <br />court rejected that argument finding that, although the Park was not support- <br />ing any manufacturing uses and was thus not being used for the price purpose <br />for which the restrictive covenant was created, the restrictions still provided a <br />valuable benefit to the City in that it restricted all residential use of land, <br />"while maintaining an active economic district, protecting certain areas as <br />open space, and maintaining buffer zones which protect[ed] the [a local river] <br />from encroaching development." <br />©2018 Thomson Reuters 11 <br />
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