Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/05/2018

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Zoning Bulletin February 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 3 not amount to "industrial manufacturing" because the compost was not be- ing packaged and sold as a product off -site. Alternatively, the Pelletiers contended that the processing of compost on their Property was a permit- ted accessory use because compost was used in the operation of a nursery, which was a permitted use in the R-80 zone. DECISION: Judgment of superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the Pelletiers' conviction of violating the Town zoning ordinance by manufacturing compost on res- idential property was supported by sufficient evidence. Although the zon- ing ordinance did not define "manufacturing," the court noted that it has been defined as "the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving the materials new forms, qualities, properties or combination whether by hand labor or machines." The court found that the evidence established that the Pelletiers: procured truckloads of waste materials from off -site to be transported to their Property; actively combined those waste materials with heavy industrial equipment; and produced large quantities of finished compost that was ultimately used off - site through the Pelletiers' landscaping business. The court emphasized that it found that the use of "heavy, noise -emitting industrial equipment coupled with delivery of truckloads of organic material . . . on a daily basis," established the elements of "manufacturing" and "processing" that set the Pelletiers composting activities apart from the "average home- owner who engages in composting." In so holding, the court rejected the Pelletiers' arguments that their composting activities could not be categorized as "industrial manufacturing." The court said that, whether or not the Pelletiers were selling their compost for profit was "immaterial." The court noted that the Town zoning ordinance entitled "Industrial uses" was devoid of any requirement that manufactured products be "packaged, shipped, and sold for profit." Moreover, the court found that the plain meanings of "manufac- turing" and "industrial" did "not necessarily involve retail activity." The court also rejected the Pelletiers' argument that the processing of compost on their Property was a permitted accessory use because compost was used in the nursery, which was a permitted use in the R-80 zone. The Town zoning ordinance defined accessory use as a use of land or building "customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the land or building . . . ." The court acknowledged that the use of compost in con- nection with a nursery use was allowed as an accessory use. However, the court distinguished such an accessory use of compost from "the [industrial] manufacturing, storing, and processing of compost" performed on a "large scale" by the Pelletiers. The "industrial manufacturing" of compost by the Pelletiers, found the court, was not allowed even as an accessory use since the zoning ordinance expressly prohibited "manufacturing, storing, processing, and fabricating activities" in an R-80 zone. Accordingly, the court held that manufacturing compost on the Pelletiers' Property was not a permitted accessory use. © 2018 Thomson Reuters 9