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Zoning Bulletin February 25, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 4 <br />24:52:07:01 and ARSD 24:52:07:04 included historic districts within the statu- <br />tory definition of "historic property." (See SDCL 1-19A-2(3).) Therefore, <br />explained the court, "ARSD 24:52:07:01's reference to listed `historic proper- <br />ties' cannot be read as language limiting the applicability of the chapter's <br />substantive regulations to individually owned historic properties." Since <br />McKennan Park itself was a listed historic property, and the Sapienzas' <br />individually owned property was within McKennan Park, the court concluded <br />that even through the Sapienzas' home was not individually listed on state or <br />national registers, the State historic -district regulations still applied to the <br />Sapienzas' property. In other words, because the McKennan Park historic <br />district was itself a "historic property" that was listed on state and national <br />registers, the requirements of the State historic -district regulations (i.e., ARSD <br />24:52:07:04) applied to any new construction or additions within McKennan <br />Park, including the Sapienzas' new home construction. <br />The court also concluded that the issuance of the injunction requiring the <br />Sapienzas to modify their newly -constructed home to comply with the <br />historic -district regulations was warranted. In so concluding, the court <br />explained that in determining whether an injunction requiring modification of <br />the Sapienzas' home was warranted, it had to look at: (1) whether an injunc- <br />tion was statutorily authorized under state law (SDCL 21-8-14); and, if so, (2) <br />whether the circuit court's decision to grant the injunction was an abuse of <br />discretion. <br />The court found that an injunction was statutorily authorized in this case. <br />The court noted that under SDCL 21-8-14(1), an injunction could be granted <br />to prevent the breach of an obligation (i.e., here, the historic -district regula- <br />tions), where "pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief." <br />Here, the court determined that pecuniary compensation would not provide <br />adequate relief as the failure of the Sapienzas to construct their home in accor- <br />dance with historic standards: (1) impaired the historical integrity of the <br />McKennan Park historic district; (2) decreased the market value of the <br />McDowells' home; and (3) interfered with the McDowell's use and enjoyment <br />of their home. These "intangible harms" said the court, "are often not rectified <br />by pecuniary compensation." <br />Next, the court concluded that the circuit court had not abused its discretion <br />in issuing the injunction. The court said this was because: (1) the Sapienzas <br />caused the harm, which (2) was irreparable without the injunction because the <br />undermining of the historic district could not be remedied by a payment of <br />money to the McDowells; and (3) the Sapienzas' acts "were not innocent <br />mistakes," as they chose to use a construction company unfamiliar with stan- <br />dards for historic districts, and submitted to the Board renderings that did not <br />accurately reflect what they later built; and (4) the hardship to be suffered by <br />the Sapienzas in modifying their newly -constructed home was not "dispropor- <br />tionate" to the benefit to be gained by the McDowells, whose privacy and use <br />and enjoyment of their home was impacted by the Sapienzas' home. <br />See also: Vieux Carre Property Owners & Associates, Inc. v. City of New <br />Orleans, 246 La. 788, 167 So. 2d 367 (1964). <br />See also: Faulkner v. Town of Chestertown, 290 Md. 214, 428 A.2d 879 <br />(1981). <br />© 2018 Thomson Reuters 7 <br />