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April 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 7 Zoning Bulletin <br />Pursuant to the County's zoning ordinance, the BZA, when <br />determining whether to issue the special exception, was required to, <br />among other things: (1) conclude that the special exception would <br />not adversely affect the public interest; (2) consider the impact on <br />other property owners; and (3) properly consider setback require- <br />ments, including a one -mile setback of CAFO's from schools. Con- <br />trary to House of Prayer's assertions, the appellate court determined <br />that the BZA had properly applied those considerations when it is- <br />sued the special exception to Milco. Specifically, the court concluded <br />that: (1) the BZA had properly considered the affect of the CAFO on <br />the public interest, and had applied conditions on the special excep- <br />tion approval to ensure that the CAFO would not adversely affect <br />the public interest; (2) the BZA had properly considered the impact <br />on other property owners, and had determined that the CAFO use <br />was compatible with the adjacent properties in the agricultural zon- <br />ing district; and (3) the BZA did not err when it permitted Milco's <br />CAFO to be located one-half mile, rather than one full mile, from <br />House of Prayer's property because the BZA's determination that the <br />House of Prayer's youth summer camp was not a "school" within <br />the ordinance was not an interpretation that was inconsistent with or <br />contrary to the ordinance itself. <br />In rejecting House of Prayer's claims that the BZA's grant of the <br />special exception violated House of Prayer's religious rights under <br />federal and state laws, the appellate court addressed each of those <br />laws in turn. <br />The court explained that the federal RLUIPA provides that "[n]o <br />government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a <br />manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of <br />a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the <br />government demonstrates that imposition of the burden" is both "in <br />furtherance of a compelling government interest" and "the least re- <br />strictive means of furthering that compelling government interest." <br />(42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(1).) RLUIPA further provides that "[n]o <br />government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a <br />manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than <br />equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution." (42 <br />U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(b)(1).) RLUIPA defines a "land use regulation" <br />in relevant part as "a zoning . . . law, or the application of such a <br />law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use . . . of land . . . , if the <br />claimant has . . . [a] property interest in the regulated land . . . ." <br />(42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5(5).) <br />House of Prayer had asserted that the BZA's decision to grant the <br />special exception to Milco was a "substantial burden" on House of <br />10 ©2018 Thomson Reuters <br />