Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/12/2018

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June 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 11 Zoning Bulletin narrowly: "when the government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such as a bank account or parcel of real property . . . ." Here, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the County's Development Impact Fee Ordinance did not fit that narrow window for application of the nexus and rough proportionality analysis. The court found that the Ordinance here did not direct a property owner to make a conditional monetary payment to obtain approval of an application for a permit of any particular kind, nor did it impose the condition on a particularized or discretionary basis. Rather, the court found that the Ordinance was "imposed broadly on all properties, within defined geographical districts, that may be proposed for development," leaving "no discretion in the imposition or the calculation of the fee." In other words, the Ordinance here imposed an impact fee on a generalized district -wide basis, making no determination as to whether an actual permit would issue to a payor individual with a property interest. And, the County impact fee was "predetermined" based on a specific monetary schedule and applied to all persons wishing to develop property in the district. The Court of Appeals of Maryland said the law recognized that cases such as that here where impact fees are imposed on a generally applicable basis are not subject to a rough proportionality or nexus analysis. See also: Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 337 Md. 15, 650 A.2d 712 (1994). See also: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304, 38 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1769, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 21083 (1994). See also: Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 26 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1073, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. 20918 (1987). See also: Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591, 186 L. Ed. 2d 697, 76 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1649 (2013). Case Note: The Dabbs Class had also argued that amendments to the County's Impact Fee Ordinance unconstitutionally interfered with their vested rights in refunds. The circuit court rejected those claims. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Ap- peals of Maryland also affirmed, finding the amendments to the County Impact Fee Ordinance, which codified the County's pre-existing administrative procedures for counting impact fee encumbrances, did "not work substantive change in policy" interfering with the vested rights of the Dabbs Class. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that the Dabbs Class' alleged right to refund of the development impact fee did not vest, and thus, the county had the right to repeal the refund provision of the ordinance. 8 © 2018 Thomson Reuters