Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/12/2018

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June 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I issue 11 Zoning Bulletin rezoning application. The Byrons further argued that since the City failed to do so, as a result, the City's rezoning decision in favor of SYNCO was invalid. The City and SYNCO argued that the Byrons lacked standing to bring their claims (i.e., the legal right to bring their action in court). The trial court found that the Byrons had standing, but nonetheless dismissed all the claims against the City and SYNCO. The Byrons appealed. The Byrons argued on appeal only that the trial court: (1) incorrectly concluded that the City was not required to apply the Protest Petition Statute to the rezoning due to its misinterpretation of the effective date of Session Law 2015-160; (2) wrongfully concluded their challenges to certain zoning statutes and session laws were moot; and (3) impermissibly dismissed their constitutional challenges to those zoning statutes and session laws. The Byrons did not appeal their claimed inherent invalidity of the rezon- ing decision itself. Again, the City and SYNCO argued that the Byrons lacked standing to bring those claims. DECISION: Judgment of superior court affirmed. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina agreed with the City and SYNCO and held that the Byrons lacked standing to bring their appealed claims. In so holding, the court distinguished the different standing doctrines ap- plicable to: (1) zoning ordinance challenges; (2) statutory construction and va- lidity claims; and (3) constitutional challenges to zoning ordinances. The court said "[a] rezoning ordinance may be challenged in a declaratory judgment ac- tion 'only . . , by a person who has a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter affected by the zoning ordinance and who is directly and adversely affected thereby.' " Comparatively, "[s]tanding to challenge a stat- ute requires that the statute directly and adversely affect the plaintiff." And, "standing to challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance or statute requires that the plaintiff demonstrate injury or immediate danger of injury to a constitutionally protected interest in the property subject to that ordinance or statute." Here, in applying the standing doctrines, the court emphasized that the Byrons sought to "revive their declaratory judgment action only as to their challenges of the interpretation and constitutionality of the statues and session laws governing the City's rezoning decision, rather than the inherent validity of the rezoning decision itself." Thus, the court did not look to whether the Byrons had standing to challenge the rezoning decision (as they had sought to do in the claims not at issue on appeal), "but whether they had standing to seek a declaratory judgment determining the construction and constitutional- ity of the session laws and statutes governing that rezoning." The court concluded that the Byron's lacked standing to challenge the City's interpretation of Session Law 2015-160 and the applicability of the Protest Pe- tition Statute. Looking at the standing doctrines, the court said that the Byrons could only seek a declaratory judgment proclaiming their preferred interpreta- tion of the statute if they were "directly and adversely affected" by its enact- ment and replacement of the protest petition procedures with citizen comments. However, the court noted that the Byrons were never entitled to 10 ©2018 Thomson Reuters