Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/01/2018

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September 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 17 Zoning Bulletin In November 2015, the trial justice entered an order granting the Board's motion to enforce. When, by March 2016, McLaughlin still had not removed the garage, the Town removed it. The Town also placed a lien on McLaughlin's property for the $69,300 in fines imposed by an August 2015 contempt order related to McLaughlin's failure to remove the garage as court ordered in the April 2014 Order. In May 2016, McLaughlin filed a motion to vacate the April 2014 Order. Among other things, McLaughlin argued that because the Superior Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to order him to remove the garage, the April 2014 Order was void under Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4). That rule allows relief from judgment or order when the judg- ment is void. McLaughlin rested his argument on the fact that, pursuant to § 45-24-62, the Town had not filed a separate action to obtain a removal order and thus the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction when it acted. McLaugh- lin also argued in the alternative that the April 2014 Order should be vacated under Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(6), because the lack of a separate action brought by the Town and the interests of justice justified relief from the operation of the order. Rule 60(b)(6) allows for relief from final judgment or order for "[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." In summary, McLaughlin contended that: (1) the Superior Court lacked the authority to entertain the zoning board's request that he be ordered to remove his garage; and (2) in order for the Town to have properly. obtained an order requiring him to remove the garage, the Town should have filed a separate action in the Superior Court, not a motion for an order to comply filed by the Board in a zoning appeal. The superior court rejected McLaughlin's arguments. McLaughlin appealed. THE COURT'S DECISION: Order denying motion to vacate reversed. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island agreed with McLaughlin that the April 2014 Order should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, in the interests of justice "given the unique circumstances of this case." In so holding, the court first disagreed with McLaughlin that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the removal of McLaughlin's ga- rage and was thus void under Rule 60(b)(4). The court instead found that, pur- suant to § 45-24-62(3), the superior court possessed the jurisdiction to order the removal of McLaughlin's garage. Again, § 45-24-62 vests the superior court with jurisdiction to aid towns and cities in their enforcement of their zoning ordinances, "upon due proceed- ings in the name of the city or town, instituted by its city or town solicitor . .." That statute also authorizes the superior court to, among other things, "order the removal by the property owner of any building, structure . . . in violation of any zoning ordinance . . . and to authorize some official of the city or town, in the default of the removal by the owner, to remove it at the expense of the owner . . .." Looking at the language of the statute, the court concluded that it was "constrained to conclude that the Superior Court was vested with the subject 4 © 2018 Thomson Reuters