Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/01/2018

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Zoning Bulletin September 25, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 18 her sign was not an "advertising sign," the City had no authority to regulate it. The trial court found that Arisian's signs violated the City's zoning restrictions on the size, height, and number of signs. However, the court nonetheless concluded that, as Arisian had argued, the City lacked the authority to regulate Arisian's signs under § 8-2 because her signs were not "advertising signs" in that they did not promote the sale of goods or services. The ZEO appealed. On appeal, the ZFO argued that an "advertising" sign, "as that term is used in § 8-2 and as that term is commonly defined, means any sign that makes a public announcement" DECISION: Judgment of Superior Court affirmed. Rejecting the ZEO's argument for a broader meaning to be applied to "advertising signs," and agreeing with Arisian, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that Arisian's signs, which disparaged a commercial vendor, were not "advertising signs," as regulated by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-2. Accordingly, the court concluded that the City's regulation of such signs was outside the scope of the authority granted to the City under § 8-2. In reaching its conclusion, the court analyzed the meaning of the term "advertising signs," as used in § 8-2. Finding no definition of "advertising signs" or "advertise" "anywhere in the General Statutes that provides guidance in the present case," the court looked to the common meaning of "advertising" as defined in dictionaries contempo- raneous with the time of the legislative grant of municipal zoning authority to regulate "advertising signs and billboards" —in 1931. The court found that in dictionaries of that time, "advertising" was defined as "[a]ny form of public announcement intended to aid directly or indirectly in the sale of a commodity, etc., in the promulgation of a doctrine or idea, in securing attendance, as at a meeting, or the like." In general, the court found that according to contemporaneous dictionar- ies, around 1931, "advertising" referred to "the promotion of many subjects, of which commercial goods and services were perhaps the most common." The court found that because the announcement was "intended to aid" the proponent (i.e., the person advertising), the defi- nition "implie[d] that some benefit inure[d] to the proponent through such promotion." Again, the ZEO had argued that a broader meaning of "advertise" should be applied here —namely a meaning that encompasses any sign that makes a public announcement. The court disagreed. Linking the contemporaneous dictionary definition it had found of "advertising" to the contemporaneous dictionary definition of "sign" (i.e., a lettered board or notice placed to advertise a business), the court found "further evidence" to support its conclusion that the legislature, in enacting © 2018 Thomson Reuters 7