Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/03/2019

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December 10, 2018 I Volume 12 I Issue 23 Zoning Bulletin manner consistent with existing zoning, (2) [IO's] plight [was] due to unique circumstances and not to general conditions in the neighborhood that may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning, (3) [the billboard use] authorized by the variance [would] not alter the essential character of a locality, and (4) the hardship [was] not the result of [IO's] own actions." The parties did not dispute the fast three elements of this hardship test, but did dispute the fourth. Specifically, the City argued that IO created the hardship it now complained of by purchasing property with the knowledge that billboards were prohibited on the property. IO and the BZA argued that IO did not physically alter the prop- erty so as to create the hardship at issue, and that IO could thus seek any vari- ance the law permitted and should not be limited just because it purchased the property with knowledge of the banned use. The court acknowledged that on the basis of the "self-created hardship rule," a zoning board must deny a variance "when a landowner or predecessor in title partitions, subdivides, or somehow physically alters the land after the enactment of the applicable zoning ordinance, so as to render it unfit for the uses for which it was zone." In other words, the court said that a landowner "is not entitled to a hardship variance if the parcel has a reasonable use under the zoning ordinance and the landowner's subsequent act of splitting the property renders the property unfit for the uses for which it was zoned." But the court found such circumstances were not present here, and so the rule requiring a variance denial did not apply. The court specifically "decline[d] to extend the self-created hardship rule to all instances where a landowner simply purchases the property with knowledge of an ordinance's applicable restriction." In other words, the court concluded that IO's purchase of the property with knowledge of the ordinance banning billboards did not preclude the BZA from granting the use variance. The court further concluded that the variance was properly granted because "IO proved an unnecessary economic hardship meriting relief under MCL 125.3604(7)." See also: Johnson v. Robinson Tp., 420 Mich. 115, 359 N.W.2d 526 (1984). See also: Bierman v. Taymouth Tp., 147 Mich. App. 499, 383 N.W.2d 235 (1985). See also: Crydefman v. City of Birmingham, 171 Mich. App. 15, 429 N.W.2d 625 (1988). Due Process —City . issues ordinance violation to property owner six months after violation is recorded Property owner argues this delay in issuing citation violated her due process rights Citation: Tucker v. City of Chicago, 2018 WL 5095151 (7th Cir. 2018) 4 ©2018 Thomson Reuters