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February 25, 2019 ',Volume 13 I Issue 4 Zoning Bulletin
<br />Process/Final Action —
<br />Telecommunications
<br />provider challenges oral
<br />decision of city zoning
<br />board
<br />Parties dispute whether oral decision is
<br />appealable "final action" under federal law
<br />Citation: T Mobile Northeast LLC v. City of Wilmington,
<br />Delaware, 2019 WL 150630 (3d Cir: 2019)
<br />The Third Circuit has jurisdiction over Delaware, New
<br />Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
<br />THIRD CIRCUIT (DELAWARE) (01/10/19)—This
<br />case addressed the issue of whether an oral decision of a
<br />zoning board of appeals was a "final action" under the
<br />review provision of the federal Telecommunications Act of
<br />1966 ("TCA") (47 U.S.C.A. § 332). It also addressed the
<br />issue of whether the timing requirement in the TCA's
<br />review provision is jurisdictional. Finally, it addressed
<br />whether an untimely supplemental complaint can relate
<br />back and cure an unripe initial complaint.
<br />The Background/Facts: T Mobile Northeast LLC ("T
<br />Mobile"), a wireless telecommunications service provider,
<br />applied to the Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA") of the
<br />City of Wilmington (the "City") for permission to erect an
<br />antenna in the City. The ZBA ultimately denied the request
<br />in an oral decision. T Mobile then filed a legal action within
<br />30 days of the ZBA's oral decision, challenging the denial.
<br />Two days after the City filed its answer in the action, the
<br />ZBA issued its written decision on T Mobile's application.
<br />Nearly a year after the ZBA issued its written denial, T
<br />Mobile filed a motion in its case, seeking leave to amend
<br />or supplement its initial complaint to note the issuance of
<br />that written decision.
<br />Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute,
<br />and deciding the matter on the law alone, the district court
<br />granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The district
<br />court concluded that T Mobile's initial complaint was "ir-
<br />reparably unripe" because both the TCA and Delaware law
<br />required the ZBA to issue a written decision before the
<br />ZBA's action could be considered "final" (and thus subject
<br />to appeal under the TCA review provision).
<br />The TCA grants "[a]ny person adversely affected by any
<br />final action or failure to act by a State or local government
<br />or any instrumentality thereof' a right to have that locali-
<br />ty's decision reviewed by "commenc[ing] an action"
<br />"within 30 days" in district court. (47 U.S.C.A.
<br />§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v).) The TCA also states that "[a]ny deci-
<br />sion by a State or local government or instrumentality
<br />thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify
<br />personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and
<br />supported by substantial evidence contained in a written
<br />record." (47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).)
<br />Thus, the district court concluded that T Mobile had filed
<br />its initial complaint too soon. The court also concluded that
<br />T Mobile's supplemental complaint could not fix the ripe-
<br />ness problem because it was filed past the 30-day window
<br />for seeking review of the ZBA's final action.
<br />T Mobil appealed. On appeal, T Mobil contended that
<br />there was jurisdiction to hear its case. It advanced two
<br />alternative grounds for reversal: that its complaint was ripe
<br />because the ZBA's oral decision qualified as a "final ac-
<br />tion" under the review provision of the TCA, and, in the
<br />alternative, that its supplemental complaint related back to
<br />and cured any ripeness problem with its initial complaint.
<br />DECISION: Judgment of district court reversed in
<br />part, vacated in part, and remanded.
<br />Disagreeing with T Mobile's first argument, the United
<br />States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that that an
<br />oral decision of the ZBA does not qualify as a "final ac-
<br />tion" under the TCA's review provision. However, the
<br />court agreed with T Mobile that jurisdiction was proper in
<br />the District Court because the timing requirement in the
<br />TCA's review provision was non -jurisdictional, and T
<br />Mobile's supplemental complaint therefore related back
<br />and cured the ripeness problem with the initial complaint.
<br />The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court should
<br />thus have reached the merits of the dispute.
<br />In so holding, the court explained that the terms "act,"
<br />"final action," and "decision . . . to deny" are not defined
<br />in the TCA. Furtheiinore, the court found that the TCA
<br />failed to make clear whether "final action" should be read
<br />to encompass all decisions to deny, including oral ones.
<br />However, looking at the "text and structure" of the TCA,
<br />Delaware procedures, Supreme Court reasoning, decisions
<br />of sister circuits, and policy arguments, the court found
<br />they all supported the conclusion that "a writing is in fact a
<br />requirement for a denial to be final" under the TCA's
<br />review provision. In light of that conclusion, the court held
<br />that, here, the ZBA's oral decision was not a "final action"
<br />ripe for judicial review. As such, T Mobile's initial com-
<br />plaint's cause of action was "not ripe."
<br />Having determined that T Mobile's initial complaint was
<br />not ripe for review because the oral decision that it chal-
<br />lenged did not constitute a final action, and noting that T
<br />Mobile's supplemental complaint was filed more than 30
<br />days after the ZBA's written "final" decision and was
<br />therefore untimely under the TCA's review provision (see
<br />47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)), the court noted that the
<br />district court only had jurisdiction if T Mobile's supplemen-
<br />tal complaint "cured the ripeness flaw in its initial com-
<br />plaint by relating back to the original filing date." That
<br />would only be possible, noted the court, if the 30-day time
<br />limit in the TCA's review provision was non jurisdictional.
<br />And, the court concluded that it was non jurisdictional.
<br />The court explained that a Supreme Court -issued "read-
<br />ily administrable bright line for determining whether to
<br />classify statutory limitation as jurisdictional" was to
<br />determine "whether Congress has clearly state[d] that the,
<br />rule is jurisdictional." "[A]bsent such a clear statement,"
<br />the court said that it should treat the restriction as "nonjuris-
<br />dictional in character." Here, the court concluded that the
<br />30-day time limit in the TCA's review provision was not
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