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February 25, 2019 ',Volume 13 I Issue 4 Zoning Bulletin <br />Process/Final Action — <br />Telecommunications <br />provider challenges oral <br />decision of city zoning <br />board <br />Parties dispute whether oral decision is <br />appealable "final action" under federal law <br />Citation: T Mobile Northeast LLC v. City of Wilmington, <br />Delaware, 2019 WL 150630 (3d Cir: 2019) <br />The Third Circuit has jurisdiction over Delaware, New <br />Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. <br />THIRD CIRCUIT (DELAWARE) (01/10/19)—This <br />case addressed the issue of whether an oral decision of a <br />zoning board of appeals was a "final action" under the <br />review provision of the federal Telecommunications Act of <br />1966 ("TCA") (47 U.S.C.A. § 332). It also addressed the <br />issue of whether the timing requirement in the TCA's <br />review provision is jurisdictional. Finally, it addressed <br />whether an untimely supplemental complaint can relate <br />back and cure an unripe initial complaint. <br />The Background/Facts: T Mobile Northeast LLC ("T <br />Mobile"), a wireless telecommunications service provider, <br />applied to the Zoning Board of Adjustment ("ZBA") of the <br />City of Wilmington (the "City") for permission to erect an <br />antenna in the City. The ZBA ultimately denied the request <br />in an oral decision. T Mobile then filed a legal action within <br />30 days of the ZBA's oral decision, challenging the denial. <br />Two days after the City filed its answer in the action, the <br />ZBA issued its written decision on T Mobile's application. <br />Nearly a year after the ZBA issued its written denial, T <br />Mobile filed a motion in its case, seeking leave to amend <br />or supplement its initial complaint to note the issuance of <br />that written decision. <br />Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, <br />and deciding the matter on the law alone, the district court <br />granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The district <br />court concluded that T Mobile's initial complaint was "ir- <br />reparably unripe" because both the TCA and Delaware law <br />required the ZBA to issue a written decision before the <br />ZBA's action could be considered "final" (and thus subject <br />to appeal under the TCA review provision). <br />The TCA grants "[a]ny person adversely affected by any <br />final action or failure to act by a State or local government <br />or any instrumentality thereof' a right to have that locali- <br />ty's decision reviewed by "commenc[ing] an action" <br />"within 30 days" in district court. (47 U.S.C.A. <br />§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v).) The TCA also states that "[a]ny deci- <br />sion by a State or local government or instrumentality <br />thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify <br />personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and <br />supported by substantial evidence contained in a written <br />record." (47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).) <br />Thus, the district court concluded that T Mobile had filed <br />its initial complaint too soon. The court also concluded that <br />T Mobile's supplemental complaint could not fix the ripe- <br />ness problem because it was filed past the 30-day window <br />for seeking review of the ZBA's final action. <br />T Mobil appealed. On appeal, T Mobil contended that <br />there was jurisdiction to hear its case. It advanced two <br />alternative grounds for reversal: that its complaint was ripe <br />because the ZBA's oral decision qualified as a "final ac- <br />tion" under the review provision of the TCA, and, in the <br />alternative, that its supplemental complaint related back to <br />and cured any ripeness problem with its initial complaint. <br />DECISION: Judgment of district court reversed in <br />part, vacated in part, and remanded. <br />Disagreeing with T Mobile's first argument, the United <br />States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that that an <br />oral decision of the ZBA does not qualify as a "final ac- <br />tion" under the TCA's review provision. However, the <br />court agreed with T Mobile that jurisdiction was proper in <br />the District Court because the timing requirement in the <br />TCA's review provision was non -jurisdictional, and T <br />Mobile's supplemental complaint therefore related back <br />and cured the ripeness problem with the initial complaint. <br />The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court should <br />thus have reached the merits of the dispute. <br />In so holding, the court explained that the terms "act," <br />"final action," and "decision . . . to deny" are not defined <br />in the TCA. Furtheiinore, the court found that the TCA <br />failed to make clear whether "final action" should be read <br />to encompass all decisions to deny, including oral ones. <br />However, looking at the "text and structure" of the TCA, <br />Delaware procedures, Supreme Court reasoning, decisions <br />of sister circuits, and policy arguments, the court found <br />they all supported the conclusion that "a writing is in fact a <br />requirement for a denial to be final" under the TCA's <br />review provision. In light of that conclusion, the court held <br />that, here, the ZBA's oral decision was not a "final action" <br />ripe for judicial review. As such, T Mobile's initial com- <br />plaint's cause of action was "not ripe." <br />Having determined that T Mobile's initial complaint was <br />not ripe for review because the oral decision that it chal- <br />lenged did not constitute a final action, and noting that T <br />Mobile's supplemental complaint was filed more than 30 <br />days after the ZBA's written "final" decision and was <br />therefore untimely under the TCA's review provision (see <br />47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)), the court noted that the <br />district court only had jurisdiction if T Mobile's supplemen- <br />tal complaint "cured the ripeness flaw in its initial com- <br />plaint by relating back to the original filing date." That <br />would only be possible, noted the court, if the 30-day time <br />limit in the TCA's review provision was non jurisdictional. <br />And, the court concluded that it was non jurisdictional. <br />The court explained that a Supreme Court -issued "read- <br />ily administrable bright line for determining whether to <br />classify statutory limitation as jurisdictional" was to <br />determine "whether Congress has clearly state[d] that the, <br />rule is jurisdictional." "[A]bsent such a clear statement," <br />the court said that it should treat the restriction as "nonjuris- <br />dictional in character." Here, the court concluded that the <br />30-day time limit in the TCA's review provision was not <br />4 ©2019 Thomson Reuters <br />