Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/04/2019

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February 25, 2019 I Volume 13 I Issue 4 had standing. The court found that none of the individuals made a "clear, requisite showing of an ongoing, concrete, and particularized injury caused by the Ordinance and capable of being redressed in a favorable ruling in [the] appeals." Specifically, the court found that: one of the individuals no longer owned property in the City; three of the individuals failed to allege how the Ordinance was preventing or hampering any of their home -sharing activi- ties in the City; and two of the individuals were out-of- town renters who had failed to establish whether they still wished to visit the City and, if so, how the Ordinance was inhibiting them from doing so. Moreover, the court found that Keep Chicago Livable had failed to allege a "concrete and particularized injury to the organization," but had instead "shown little more than a 'mere interest in a problem.' " Further, even assuming that Keep Chicago Liv- able had brought the action on behalf of its members, the court found that the organization was_ "unable to identify an individual plaintiff with standing to bring any claim." See also: Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 34 Env't. Rep. Gas. (BNA) 1785, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20913 (1992). See also: Hunt v. Washington. State Apple Advertising Cona'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977). Case Note: In its decision, the court acknowledged that, although facts on the record before it did not establish standing by any of the Plaintiffs, on remand, they may be present evidence establishing standing. Proceedings/Ripeness/ RLUIPA—Church contends city's zoning code violates Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Church appeals district court finding that its claims are not ripe and moot Citation: Church of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ v. City of Markham, Illinois, 2019 WL 244735 (7th Cir. 2019) The Seventh Circuit has jurisdiction over Illinois, Indi- ana, and Wisconsin. SEVENTH CIRCUIT (ILLINOIS) (01/17/19)—This case addressed the issue of whether a church's claims, chal- lenging a city's zoning code under the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") were ripe and/or moot. The Background/Facts: In 1985, Reginald McCracken Zoning Bulletin ("McCracken") purchased a single-family residence (the "Property") in an R-3 One -Family Residential zoning district in the City of Markham (the "City"). McCracken was the pastor of The Church of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ (the "Church"). The Church converted the Property into a house of worship. The City Zoning Code did not expressly provide for any conditional uses in the R-3 district, and only permitted churches as a conditional use in the City's R-1 district. No provision in the City Zoning Code expressly identified churches as a permitted use. At some point, the City filed a legal action against the Church in state court. The City sought an injunction to halt the Church's operation on the Property without a valid conditional use permit. The Church requested a continuance from the district court to apply for a conditional use permit with the City. The court granted the continuance. The Church then ap- plied for a conditional use permit, but did not request needed variances from the City's parking regulations. Eventually, the City denied the Church's conditional use permit application. Following the denial of the conditional use permit, the Church sued the City. Among other things, it argued that the City's Zoning Code violated the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc et seq.). The Church argued that a church wasa permitted use of the Property, such that the City's insistence on a conditional use permit was incorrect and "constituted a substantial burden on the [C]hurch's religious exercise" in violation of RLUIPA. Alternatively, the Church argued that a church was a conditional use in R-3 districts, which would mean that the City Zoning Code provides no districts in which religious facilities are permitted as of right, "thereby violating RLUIPA's equal - terms and unreasonable limitations provisions." The City maintained that, under the City Zoning Code, churches were a conditional use in R-3 districts, but were permitted as of right in the City's commercial and industrial districts. Accordingly, the City argued that there could not possibly be on equal terms or unreasonable limitations problem, and, thus, no violation of RLUIPA. Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the district court issued summary judgment in favor of the City. The district court ruled that the Church's claims were not ripe when the Church filed its action because the Church had failed to ap- ply for necessary parking variances. The district court also ruled that the Church's claims were moot because the City had ultimately (while the litigation was pending) issued a parking variance and a conditional use permit to the Church. The Church appealed. DECISION: Judgment of district court reversed, and matter remanded. The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,, held that the ripeness of the Church's claims did not hinge on the pursuit of parking variances because they said "noth- ing about whether the [C]hurch's use of the Property [was] permissible." The court also held that the City's issuance to 6 © 2019 Thomson Reuters