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10/29/2020 State v. Castellano :: 1993 :: Minnesota Court of Appeals Decisions :: Minnesota Case Law :: Minnesota Law :: US Law :: Justia
<br />ANALYSIS
<br />At issue in this case is a municipal ordinance prohibiting focused, or targeted residential
<br />picketing. [1] The constitutionality of an ordinance is a question of law. See Hibbing Educ.
<br />Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn. 1985)
<br />(construction of a statute is clearly a question of law fully reviewable by an appellate court);
<br />State v. Clarke Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 238 Minn. 192, 197, 56 N.W.2d 667, 671 (1952)
<br />(whether an ordinance is constitutionally valid is a question of law). Although ordinances
<br />are ordinarily afforded a presumption of constitutionality, ordinances restricting First
<br />Amendment rights are not so presumed. Goward v. City of Minneapolis, 456 N.W.2d 460,
<br />464 (Minn.App.199o). The burden of proving the need of such a law rests with the
<br />government. Id. (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426, io8 S. Ct. 1886, 1894, 10o L. Ed.
<br />2d 425 (1988)).
<br />I. Overbreadth
<br />In the area of freedom of expression, it is well -established that an overbroad *645
<br />regulation may be subject to facial review and invalidation even though the application in a
<br />particular case may be constitutionally unobjectionable. Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
<br />Movement, U.S. , , 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 120 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1992).
<br />Permitting a facial challenge to allegedly overbroad legislation is an exception to general
<br />standing principles. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 6oi, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2917, 37 L.
<br />Ed. 2d 83o (1973). The exception is "based on an appreciation that the very existence of
<br />some broadly written laws has the potential to chill the expressive activity of others not
<br />before the court." Forsyth County, U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2401.
<br />In order to invalidate a statute or ordinance on its face, the overbreadth not only must be
<br />real, but "substantial." Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574,
<br />107 S. Ct. 2568, 2572, 96 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1987). The requirement that the overbreadth be
<br />substantial arose from the Court's recognition that striking an ordinance on overbreadth
<br />grounds imposed "manifestly, strong medicine." Id. (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 93
<br />S.Ct. at 2916). The Court has required that there be a "realistic danger that the statute itself
<br />will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not
<br />before the Court" to facially challenge legislation on overbreadth grounds. Members of City
<br />Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 8oi, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2126,
<br />8o L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984).
<br />The United States Supreme Court addressed the facial constitutionality of an ordinance
<br />restricting residential picketing in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, io8 S. Ct. 2495, 101 L.
<br />https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/court-of-appeals/1993/c4-93-356.html 3/12
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