Agenda - Planning Commission - 12/01/2005

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Page 8 -- November 10, 2005 the small parcel. The delay's interference with this expectation arguably im- pacted the value of the entire small parcel, but -- even with the evidence viewed in'a light most favorable to Byrd -- any such impact was too slight to render the delay unreasonable. see also: Denene [nc. v. Ciry'of Charleston, 596 &E. 2d 917 (2004). Taking -- Small lot size keeps owner from building residence Claims town's refusal to issue permits constitutes a tala'rig Citation: Pengal v. City of Mentor-on-the-Lake, Court of Appeals of Ohio, ttth Appellate District, Lake County, iVo. 2004-L-158 (2005) OHIO (09/23/05) -- Pengal owned a sublot in the city of Mentor-on-the-Lake. The property was vacant, and surrounded by residential homes. The property was platted as a sublot when the original subdivision plat was filed in 1926, which was prior to the city's planning and zoning code. Peng'al wanted to build a single~family residence on the property; however, it was 2,000 square feet smaller than the zoning code's minimum lot size and frontage requirements. When Pengal applied for the necessary permits, the town refused to issue them. Pengal sued, claiming the permit denial was an illegal.taking of his property. The court ruled in his favor. The city appealed. DECISION: Returned to the lower court. Prior to 2005, a party could establish a takings claim on one of two ~ounds: 1) the zoning provision did not substantially advance a legitimate municipal health, safety, or welfare interest; or 2) the sorting restriction depr/ved an owner of all economically viable use of the property. However, in 2005, the U.S. Su- preme Court held that the "substantially advance" formula was not a valid method of identifying compensable regulatory takings. The lower court correctly found that the variance denial was an unconstitu- tional taking of PengaI's property. This was because Pengai's lot was platted and had been held in single and separated ownership since before the enact- ment of the ordinance. AS such, a nonconforming use as to minimum area and frontage requirements for home construction was established and should have been allowed to continue. However, the lower court did not indicate whether the basis for its decision was the lack of a substantial re.lationship with the city's zoning restrictions and any legitimate health, safety, or welfare concerns, or because the' town's ac- tions rendered Pengal's property economically nonviable. While the lower court correctly declared the zoning ordinance unconstitu- tional as appl/ed to Pengal's property, the lower court had to clarify the reasons behind its findings. see also: Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 16J L. Ed. 2d 875 (2005)i © 2005 Quinlan Publishing Group. Any reproduction is prohibited. For more information please call (617) 542-0048. 66