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fype of Interest Percentage
<br />
<br />l)ire,.:t 24
<br />Indirect t7
<br />No Bias 59
<br />
<br /> Second, to avoid pro-development bias, it
<br /> allows only two members to be engaged in
<br /> huyinff, selling, or developing real estate (or to
<br /> have recently been in that field).
<br /> A follow-up zoning bias study of Oregon
<br /> set out to determine whether these restric-
<br /> tions resulted in better board composition.
<br /> The results of the study are shown in Tables
<br /> and 5- ]-he authors concluded that the occupa-
<br /> tional restrictions did not result in a reduction
<br /> of white-collar overrepresentation. The overall
<br /> percentage of professionals on Oregon zoning
<br /> boards, in fact, is almost identical to that in
<br /> Inwa, and a~'ain, the skew is more pro-
<br /> haunted in larger cities, reaching 9t percent
<br /> in cities with populations over 2S,aoo.
<br /> Oregon's more stringent restriction on
<br />occupations related to development, however,
<br />did seem to i]ave some effect, albeit modest.
<br />As Tat]to $ shows, the percentage of
<br />~ppointees with a direct interest in develop-
<br />merit acdvity dropped to about a quarter,
<br />while [hose with no bias rose to almost 60
<br />percent, the Oregon [aw atso seemed to
<br />reduce the nomber of boards dominated by
<br />members with development interests.
<br /> Nevertheless, we still identified several
<br />Oregon boards whose composition seemed
<br />problematic. The best illustration of the
<br />©~e.,S'on law's failure to eliminate oc:upational
<br />bi;is mi§h[ be City #~39. The city's zoning
<br />commission Js composed
<br />o ~eal esi[ate agent
<br />
<br />- ~lanner ~.engineering firm)
<br />~ ~ andscape architect
<br />* ~\ppralser
<br />, ..\rchit~.'ct (m~rired)
<br />~ ;,,~oi[e~ mona§er ·
<br />- Small busiaess owner
<br /> Evmy member of this board has at least
<br />an redirect occupational bias in favor of devet-
<br />oprnem:, t-i~e first four members listed are
<br />direcdv inw)ived in develop¢nent activity,
<br />~vifi(:h may ,:~lor their decisions. Presen/ation
<br />
<br />additional business for the landscap..e archi-
<br />tect, the appraiser, the engineer, or the real
<br />estate agent. The architect, who woul8 other-
<br />wise be in the direct bias category, is retired,
<br />but may retain connections and be influenced
<br />by his or her previous occupation. Finally~ both
<br />the motel manager and the sma[I business
<br />owner would be likely to favor growth, which
<br />would provide them additional customers.
<br />Moreover, every single commission member is
<br />drawn from the professional, managerial, and
<br />technical class. If this were an economic devel-
<br />opment committee or a chamber of commerce,
<br />this occupational composition would be desk-
<br />ab[e, but for a body that is supposed to be
<br />
<br /> ruling neutrally On zoning changes and special
<br /> permit requests, a more balanced occupa-
<br /> tional mix would be preferable.
<br />
<br /> This unbalanced board may not violate
<br />' Oregon's composition restrictions, however,
<br /> because the law only limits the appointment
<br /> of those "buying, selling, or developing"
<br /> real estate. Occupations with substantial .
<br /> development connections, such as appraisers,
<br /> [andscaPers, or'even contractors, do not
<br /> fall into the restricted category. Thus, while
<br /> Oregon's [aw helps to reduce self-interest
<br /> on zoning boards, we recommend the next
<br /> section's modifications to better achieve
<br /> that purpose.
<br />
<br />ZONINGPRACTICE lo.os 83
<br />Ai~ERIEAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION I p~ge 5
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