Agenda - Planning Commission - 03/02/2006

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January I0, 2006 --Page 7 Ordinance-- Driveway and division ordinance stricter than state law Trustee claims law cannot be stricter than state standards Citation: Hilts v. Sylvan Township, Court of Appeals of Michigan, No. 256797 (2005) MICHIGAlq (11/22/05) -- Hilts, a land trustee, filed a land division application with Sylvan Township. He wanted to divide a 22.93-acre parcel into two equal parcels for distribution to two trust beneficiaries. T~e resulting parcels would both front an adjacent county road. Because of a substantial crest in the road, neither resulting parcel would comply with the sight-distance standards for new driveway locations set by the county road commission. Consequently, the commission denied driveway permits for the two proposed parcels. · Under the township ordinance, no driveway could be built without commis- sion approval, and if no driveway existed, then the land could not be divided. Importantly, the township ordinance was more restrictive than state law be- cause it required proof of commission approval of a driveway before land was deemed accessible and any land division applications could be approved. Hilts sued, arguing that state law found land accessible when it could be made accessible in the future, not only if the comm/ssion issued a permit. The court ruled hi his rayon The township appealed, arguing that it could have stricter driveway and land division standards than those under state law. DECISION: Reversed. Townships had broad powers to enact ordinances in the area of zoning and land use. However, a township could not enact an ordinance if it was in direct conflict with a state regulatory scheme or if the state statutory scheme occu- pied the field of regulation the township sought to enter. A direct conflict existed when the ordinance prohibited an act a state stat- ute permitted, or perm/ned an act a statute prohibited. Here, there was no direct conflict. Also, the state law did not show a le~s- lative intent to occupy the field with respect to the definition of "accessible." The state law de/rhaed an "accessible" parcel as a parcel that "meets" or "can ... meet" all driveway location standards se~ by the state and county highway authority pursuant to the driveway act. In turn, the driveway act provided that nothing in the driveway act could be "construed to prevent the application of the provisions of... any local ordinance which is more restrictive than this act." Therefore, by reference to the driveway act, the state law subordinated its own dethaifion of accessibility to more restrictive local ordinances. Ultimately, by the very language of the state law, the township was allowed to have stricter driveway requirements than those in the state statutory scheme. see also: City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 689 N.W..2d 482 (2004). 2006 Ouinian Puolis~mg Group. Any reproduction is prohibited. For more information please caJl (61~ 542-0048. 129