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Page 6--April 10, 2006 <br /> <br />-- again with a list of conditions. In it~ approval letter, the department specifically <br />referred to the construction of a silo to be used for cement storage and transfer. <br /> Harmony built the silo, and began storing freight and cement there and in <br />the open on its property. In 1987, it also began storing large quantities of mulch <br />and other landscaping materials. Harmony erected fences and attempted to <br />plant the trees as mandated by the f'zrst permit, but many of the trees died, and <br />those that did not only grew to be about eight feet tall. <br /> In 2003, the zoning department informed Harmony that the storage of mulch <br />was beyond the scope of the second conditional use permit. The board later <br />notified Harmony that, due in part to the lack of the mandated trees, it was also <br />in violation of the screening ordinance. The department told Harmony that it <br />had to apply for eithe_[ a new conditional use permit or modification of the <br />existing perm/ts. <br /> Harmony appealed the department's demands to the Board of Adjustment, <br />arguing that the second permit did not limit what it could store on its property <br />to cement. Harmony also argued that it should not have to apply for a new <br />permit, and challenged the screening ordinance that required stored equipment <br />and mater/als to be screened by fences or trees. <br /> The board upheld the department's decisions, and Harmony appealed. <br />DECISION: Board's decisions affirmed in part and reversed in part. <br /> The court affirmed that the storage of landscaping mater/als was outside <br />~e scope of Harmony's permit atid that Harmony must abide by the screening <br />ordinance. However, it reversed the board's decision that allowed the depart- <br />ment continued jurisdiction over the existing permits. <br /> Harmony argued that the board had erred in its determination that the stor- <br />age of mulch was not authorized by the second permit. It said that its applica- <br />tion clearly requested the use of the property for general storage, and that the <br />department's approval of the application should have encompassed this use. It <br />further argued that the board had erred by using minutes from the department <br />administrative hearing and Ianguage from its approval letter to determine the <br />scope of the permit. <br /> The court agreed that the letter, which specifically approved the permit to <br /> store cement, was not relevant. However, in the absence of specific language in <br /> the official written decision -- a standardized form that merely stated that the <br /> permit had been approved-- the court found that it was permissible for the board <br /> to consult the hearing rmnutes to determine the scope of the permit. The court <br /> found it reasonable that, after reviewing the minutes, the board would agree that <br /> the expectation of the department was for the facility to be used for cement <br /> storage and transfer, or for freight directly related to those uses. <br /> The court sided with the board's determinations, with the exception of the <br /> continuing jurisdiction provision added to the approval letter for the f'trst permit. <br /> The court stated that the department could not merely add a condition to a letter <br /> <br /> © 2006 Quintan Publisl~ing Group. Any reproduction is pronibitecL For more information please call {617) 542-0048. <br />58 <br /> <br /> <br />