Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/12/2012

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May 25, 2012 I Volume 6 I No. 10 Zoning Bulletin Catsiff appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, held that the Sign Code and design standards were constitutionally valid and did not violate Catsiff's free speech rights.In so holding, the court first determined that, contrary to Catsiff's claims, his signs were commercial speech; the signs were related solely to Catsiff's economic interests and proposed a commercial transaction. Next, because the City's Sign Code and design standards restricted com- mercial speech, the court had to decide whether the City's sign restrictions were an unconstitutional restriction of speech. In other words, the court had to decide whether, as Catsiff contended, the City had failed to meet its burden of justifying the restrictions by showing they were narrowly tailored to protect the city's substantial interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. The court explained that while signs are a form of expression protected by the free speech clause, "they pose distinctive problems that are subject to municipalities' police powers." For example, unlike oral speech, signs "take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses of land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation." The. court explained that restrictions upon the noncommunicative aspects of signs (i.e., the physical characteristics of signs) —such as found here in the size and height restrictions found in the Sign Code and the design standards —are constitutionally valid if they are: (1) content neutral (i.e., "absent censorial purpose"); (2) reasonable (i.e, not necessarily the least restrictive, but having a reasonable fit "between the means chosen and the interests asserted"); and (3) supported by legitimate regulatory interests (such as "aesthetics" and "traffic safety"). The court concluded that the City's sign restrictions under the Sign Code and the design standards were lawfully justified and constitutional, finding they were: (1) content neutral in that they did not limit what a business owner may say or depict, and they applied to all wall signs without classification and without reference to content; (2) reasonable in light of the fact that the City used certain careful considerations when choosing the size and height restric- tions; and (3) meant to protect a legitimate regulatory interest in that they were meant to eliminate "visual clutter" and applied only to signs visible to motor- ists or pedestrians on public rights -of -way (thus addressing aesthetics and traf- fic safety). See also: City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 129 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1994). See also: Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wash. 2d 737, 854 P.2d 1046 (1993). See also: State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 593 P.2d 811, 13 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1123, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1069 (1979). Case Nate: Catsiff had also argued that the ordinances were unconstitutionally vague. The court disagreed, finding it clear they regulated "wall signs" and could not be mistaken as 6 © 2012 Thomson Reuters