Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/03/2006

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Page 8 - July 10, 2006 Z.B. / ; \ Simpson's proposed plan. Importantly, the local law prohibited any develop- ment in designated open space areas of cluster subdivisions. Since the approval never became fmal because of the unfulf1lled condition, the board could review the.conditional approval and void it. see also: Star Vector Corp. v. Town of Windham, 776 A.2d 138 (2001). Condemnation - Housing authority seeks to acquire land Federal desegregation order mandates land be used as public playground Citation: Housing Authority of Macon v. Younis, Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2nd Viv., No. A06A0202 (2006) GEORGIA (05/31/06) - In 1984, as part of a desegregation order, a federal court ordered the Bibb County school board to tear down a s~hool on property iliat it owned and deed the lot to the city with the stipulation that it be used for-a public playground. Though the land was transferred to the city in 1985, the playground never was constructed. The school board quitclaimed all of its interest in the land to the city in 1987, claiming that doing so released the land from the restrictions imposed by the federal order. In 1989, the city sold a portion of the land to Younis. Younis did not make any visible improvements on the property. The housing authority of the city of Macon filed a condemnation lawsuit (. J seeking to acquire the land from Y ounis. As part of this process, a special court had to decide fair compensation for the land. Citing the restriction of the land's use, the housing authority asked the court to exclude any evidence pertaining to potential commercial value of the land. Younis argued that doing so would not allow for fair compensation. The court denied the housing authority's re- quest, and the housmg authority appealed. DECISION: Reversed. Younisargued that the housing authority did nothave the power to enforce the federal order and that the order had been voided when the school board quitclaimed the property to the city. However, the appeals court noted that the issue was not whether the housing authority had the power to enforce the order, but rather whether the order existed at all. The school board did not have the power to terminate the restliction of the property's use, and therefore, the stipulation that the land be llsed as a play- ground was still in effect. Because the federal ordt?r designated a clear land llse as a pubiic playground, any evidence as to potential value related to commer- cial use was ilTelevant. Case law stated that testimony about the "highest and best use" was not admissible where that use was precluded. The trial court had elTed by allowing such evidence, so its decision was reversed. see also: Georgia T;~ansmissionCorp. v. Barron, 566 S.E.2d 363 (2002). 92 @ 2006 Quinlan Publishing Group. Any reproduction is prohibited. For more information please call (617) 542-0048.