Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/05/1997

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" Z.B. July 10, 1997 - Page 5 DECISION: Reversed; decision to grant variance vacated. By not making the necessary findings, the board overstepped its authority and made an illegal decision. The board did not make the five necessary findings when granting the restaurant a variance; it based its decision solely on the assumption that the neighborhood should be more concerned with the garbage problem than with following the zoning laws. The decision wasn't supported by substantial evidence, so it was deemed arbitrary and capricious. Standing - Do alderwomen have authority to contest board-granted variances? State ex reI. Smith v. Grant, 943 S. W2d 319 (Missouri) 1997 Smith and Bailey were alderwomen for the city of St. Louis. Smith asked a court to review a decision, made by the city's board of adjustment, to grant a particular variance. As an alderwoman, Smith claimed, she was an officer of the city of St. Louis and had the right to ask the court to declare the board's action illegal. The court dismissed Smith's petition, saying Smith did not have standing to challenge the variance - not as a taxpayer, a voter, a neighborhood resident, or as an individual alderwoman. The court also said she was not an officer by the law's standards. Bailey asked the same court to review another board-granted variance. Like Smith, Bailey claimed she had authority as a city officer to challenge the vari- ance. The court dismissed Bailey's petition for the same reasons it rejected Smith's. Both Smith and Bailey appealed the dismissals. Because the cases were similar, they were consolidated on appeal. The alderwomen argued the court was wrong to dismiss their cases. They reasserted their standing as officers, and pointed to a statute that granted "[a ]ny person or persons jointly or severally by any decision of the board of adjustment, or any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality" standing to file a petition. The board of adjustment argued the alderwomen misread the statute. It argued the phrase "any officer department, board or bureau of the municipality" referred to those whose decisions could be appealed, not those who could appeal decisions, whether or not they were considered officers. DECISION: Affirmed. Bailey and Smith misread the statute. The statute gave standing to anyone aggrieved by the decisions made by officers, departments and boards. It did not give standing to the decisionmakers themselves. Therefore, Bailey's and Smith's status as alderwomen did not give them the right to petition the court. see also: Rosatone v. GTE Sprint Communications, 761 S. W2d 671 (1988). q7