Agenda - Planning Commission - 10/07/1997

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-. \ Z.B. September 10, 1997 - Page 7 allowing rezoning of Lindteigen's property to agricultural with an airport wouldn't be appropriate land use planning. Lindteigen appealed to court, which affirmed the city commission's decision. Lindteigen appealed again. DECISION: Affirmed. The city commission reasonably denied Lindteigen a zoning change and a special use permit for an airport. The commission considered evidence about the potential for excessive noise and danger to the public and concluded the adverse effects and the damage to neighboring properties would far exceed the private benefit to Lindteigen. This was the standard required by the city zoning ordinance. The commission also said the area was developing as rural residential, and allowing Lindteigen's property to be rezoned agricultural, with an airport, wouldn't be appropriate. see also: Ennis v. Williams County Board of Commissioners, 493 N. W2d 675 (1992). see also: City of Fargo v. Ness, 529 N. ~2d 572 (1995). q2-. Attorney's Fees - Parish sues person for ordinance violation on someone else's property Parish of Jefferson v. Levenson, 695 So.2d 1018 (Louisiana) 1997 Parish of Jefferson, La., sued Levenson, alleging he owned"property that violated a parish ordinance by having barbed wire and razor wire less than 7 feet from the ground. The parish asked the court to order Levenson to remove the barbed wire and fine him in accordance with the ordinance. Levenson denied all of the parish's allegations and asked the court to award" him sanctions, penalties, and attorney's fees. He said he didn't own the property, and the parish filed its lawsuit without performing a reasonable inquiry - as required by state law. Levenson didn't own the property in question; he was the notary on its sale. The parish asked the court to dismiss the charges, which it did. The court awarded Levenson court costs of $82 but denied his request for attorney's fees. Levenson appealed. DECISION: Reversed. Filing the lawsuit against Levenson without first verifying his ownership of the property through a title abstract was unreasonable. Levenson was entitled to attorney's fees. State law required that the parish's complaint be "well grounded in fact." In this case, that meant at the least verifying ownership of the property before suing. The parish sued Levenson for an alleged ordinance violation on property he didn't own. Even the briefest review of the property's title would have clearly shown to the parish that Levenson was the notary on the sale, not the buyer or seller. Levenson was forced to defend a lawsuit because of the parish's failure to conduct the simplest review before suing.