Laserfiche WebLink
<br />Page 4 - October 10, 1997 <br /> <br />Z.B. <br /> <br />Inyerse Condemnation - Owner says road closing is a taking <br />Department of Transportation v. Bridges, 486 S.E.2d 593 (Georgia) 1997 <br />Bridges owned an undeveloped tract of commercial land abutting Chumley <br />Circle, a public road, near its intersection with Canton Road. Bridges considered <br />Chumley Circle the primary access to Canton Road. <br />For safety reasons, the Department of Transportation closed Chumley Circle <br />at its intersection with Canton Road. This didn't prevent Bridges from using <br />Chumley Circle, but he now had to drive through residential streets and it took <br />longer to get to Canton Road. The closure also cut off the most direct route to <br />Canton Road for other property owners as well. <br />Bridges brought an inverse condemnation suit against the transportation <br />department. Under state law, landowners' rights fell into two categories: general <br />rights, which the landowner had in common with the public, and special <br />rights, which were unique to a particular landowner. For a taking or damag- <br />ing of a landowner's property to be compensable, a special right had to be <br />violated. <br />According to Bridges, blocking Chumley Circle reduced the value of his <br />property because he had to take a longer route through a residential area to get <br />to Canton Road. He also argued it was a taking because he would have to <br />change his commercial development plans due to traffic being routed through a <br />residential neighborhood. <br />The department asked for judgment without a trial, which the court denied. <br />The department appealed. <br />The appeals court affirmed, ruling Bridges deserved a trial. It found the <br />inconvenience imposed on Bridges was "unique" to his property because the <br />road's closure impacted the commercial nature of his property. <br />The department appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. <br />DECISION: Reversed. <br />Bridges was not entitled to a trial. Although his inconvenience was greater <br />than that of the general public, he lost no property right for which he was entitled <br />to compensation. <br />Bridges' access to the road abutting his property, Chumley Circle, was <br />unchanged. Because his complaint was based on the inconvenience of accessing <br />a road that did not abut his property, it was compensable only if the inconve- <br />nience was special to him - and not shared by the general public. <br />The appeals court distorted the concept of "uniqueness." That closing the <br />road made access from Bridges' property to Canton Road more roundabout <br />didn't entitle him to damages. Nor was his inconvenience turned into a <br />taking because he thought he would have to change his commercial devel.: <br />opment plans due to traffic being routed through a residential neighbor- <br />hood. <br />see also: Tift County v. Smith, 131 S.E.2d 527 (1963). <br />see also: Department of Transportation v. Durpo, 469 S.E.2d 404 (1996). <br /> <br />37 <br />