Agenda - Planning Commission - 12/02/1997

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.. Z.B. October 25, 1997 - Page 3 . .' .; laws that conflicted with it, so the earlier statute didn't apply. It didn't matter that the earlier statute applied to levees specifically. The result of the court's decision wasn't absurd, despite the fact Wynat had to seek compensation before its land was actually taken. The same principle applied to personal injury claims, where the plaintiff had to file within a certain period without knowing the full extent of his or her damages. see also: Givens v. Fifth District Levee Board, 445 So.2d 781 (1984). ~ Adult Entertainment - Manager says adult entertainment ordinance is unconstitutionally vague Maynor v. Onslow County, 488 S.E.2d 289 (North Carolina) 1997 Maynor managed The Doll House, an adult business, in Onslow County, N.C. In September 1992, the county adopted an ordinance regulating adult and sexually oriented businesses. Any adult business that didn't comply with the ordinance by September 1994 would be closed. The ordinance defined an "adult business" as any business activity or club that allowed its employees, members, or guests to exhibit any "specified anatomical area" before any other person. The ordinance defined "anatomical areas" as "less than completely and opaquely covered human genitals, pubic regions, buttocks and female breasts below a point immediately above the top of the areola." The ordinance prohibited adult businesses from being within 1000 feet of dwellings, other adult businesses, houses of worship or schools, or public playgrounds, swimming pools, or parks. In August 1994, the county zoning officer told Maynor the ordinance would take effect Sept. 21, and any nonconforming business would be "discontinued." Maynor sued the county, seeking a court order prohibiting the county from enforcing the ordinance. Maynor admitted The Doll House was located within 1000 feet of a residence. She said if the county enforced the ordinance, The Doll House would be closed. Maynor argued the county couldn't enforce the ordinance because it didn't have a comprehensive plan. She also claimed the ordinance was unconstitutional because its definition of "adult business" was vague. According to Maynor, an average person reading the ordinance would think many otherwise legal acts were conceivably prohibited from being conducted within 1000 -feet of each other, like doctors' offices, health clubs, school locker rooms, and diaper changing stations. Because the ordinance impacted communication protected by the First Amendment, Maynor said, she could challenge it based on its vagueness even though the ordinance unquestionably applied to her business. The county asked for judgment witbout a trial, which the court granted. Maynor appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The ordinance was a valid exercise of the county's police powers. It was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Maynor's business.