Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/02/1997

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Page 6 - August 10, 1997 Z.B. ,. to provide the parking spots, as well as Lanzi's knowledge of the parking situation when he bought the property, were undisputed. The trial court denied the town's motion. It found Lanzi was not bound to the Joneses' parking agreement because Lanzi was not a successor in interest to the Joneses - he was a successor to the lenders who foreclosed on the property. The court also said several questions existed about the situation: whether the shopping center's renovations were large enough to subject it to the parking ordinance, whether or not the parking agreement precluded the town from enforcing the parking ordinance, and whether the town acted within the one-year statute of limitations. . Lanzi requested judgment without a trial. Because the parking incident occurred in 1990, and the town didn't act until more than a year later, Lanzi said, the town missed the one-year statute of limitations. The court granted Lanzi judgment without a trial, finding the town did not act within the statute of limitations. In addition, the court said the town's only option - enforcing the parking agreement - was not binding to Lanzi. The town appealed. It said the court was incorrect in finding the statute of limitations barred it from enforcing the parking ordinance. DECISION: Reversed and returned to the trial court. The parking agreement was not binding to Lanzi as a successor in interest. According to the statute, all of the title's "encumbrances" were extinguished by the foreclosure. When the lenders foreclosed on the shopping center, the parking agreement was extinguished, so Lanzi was not responsible to it. Though the parking agreement did not apply, the town did have the right to enforce the parking ordinance, which said that nonconforming uses, once en- larged, were subject to the ordinance's requirements. The court was wrong to find a one-year statute of limitations prevented the town from enforcing the parking ordinance. Because each day of noncompli- ance with the ordinance constituted a separate violation, the statute of limita- tions wouldn't run out. see also: Graven v. Vail Associates Inc., 909 P.2d 514 (1995). see also: Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 504 P.2d 344 (1972). Environmental Issues - Does township have right to prohibit recycling center? Township of Howell v. Fred McDowell Inc., 693 A.2d 490 (New Jersey) 1997 Since the 1940s, Fred McDowell Inc. had operated a hot-asphalt mix plant in Howell Township, N.J. In 1990, McDowell asked the state's Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to allow it to operate on its property a recycling center for processing concrete, asphalt, and petroleum-contaminated soil. McDowell asked the Monmouth County Department of Planning to designate its site as a recycling center. The county included McDowell's site in a proposed amendment of the county plan. Notice of a public hearing was IO?