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<br />
<br />phenomenal development. Now the subject parcel was the only
<br />property in the adjoining area still zoned residential; all the
<br />other properties had been rezoned from residential to
<br />commercial, and the area was heavily built up on the north,
<br />east, and west with a variety of businesses. Moreover, the street
<br />on which the parcel fronted was now a heavily traveled, four-
<br />lane, major thoroughfare in Miami, commercially developed on
<br />both sides of the street for miles in either direction.
<br />The evidence clearly showed a transformation over a
<br />relatively long period of time in the character of the area
<br />surrounding the subject parcel. Extensive intervening rezonings,
<br />commercial development, and traffic buildup had made the
<br />once purely residential area now largely commercial. Moreover,
<br />adjoining property rezonings were of such a nature that the
<br />subject parcel had become "a 'veritable island,' or a 'literal
<br />peninsula,' of residential zoning in a surrounding sea of
<br />otherwise commercial rezonings."
<br />The court stated that the needs addressed by the property's
<br />original zoning classification had been dissipated by the city's
<br />intervening growth. Ie had now become so out of proportion
<br />with the interference with the use of the property that the city's
<br />exercise of the police power in retaining the residential use
<br />classification of the property could no longer be upheld. The
<br />court concluded that the city's refusal to rezone had arbitrarily
<br />discriminated against the landowner so that it could not make
<br />use of its land for the same commercial purposes enjoyed by
<br />adjoining neighbors.
<br />
<br />Suitability for Uses PermiHed
<br />Under Existing Zoning
<br />A tract's suitability for use as presently zoned is an important
<br />consideration in rezoning challenges. Changed conditions may
<br />create a situation where the property's zoning renders an
<br />applicant's land "no longer suitable" for the permitted use. For
<br />example, a refusal to rezone from residential to commercial is
<br />arbitrary and capricious when the subject property is no longer
<br />useful for residential purposes as a result of significantly changed
<br />conditions in the immediate area. [SeeJejferson County v.
<br />o 'Rorke, 394 So.2d 937 (Ala. 1981); Olive v. City of
<br />Jacksonville, 328 So.2d 854 (Fla. App. 1976); DeKalb County v.
<br />Albritton Properties, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1986).]
<br />However, a mere showing that changed conditions have
<br />rendered the property's development less profitable under its
<br />existing use classification is not alone sufficient to justify a
<br />zoning change. [See Woodard v. City of Decatur, 431 So.2d
<br />1173 (Ala. 1983).} Financial loss is not the test to determine
<br />whether a refusal to rezone is arbitrary and capricious. The
<br />proponent of a zoning change must introduce evidence of failed
<br />attempts to sell or develop the subject property for the zoned
<br />
<br />Zoning N~ws IS a month I)" newslctcC'f published by the American Planning Association.
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<br />uses. [See Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank v. COUllty of Cook,
<br />402 N.E.2d 719 (IlL App. 1980).]
<br />A person relying on the length of time the property has
<br />remained vacant must establish that the property is unsalable or
<br />undeveloped because of the zoning classification. Absent such
<br />proof, a court would have no more reason to conclude that the
<br />property's vacancy was occasioned by improper zoning than to
<br />conclude that the vacancy occurred because no attempts were
<br />made to use or develop the property, or because of other
<br />difficulties totally unrelated to zoning.
<br />In Woodard v. City of Decatur, 431 So.2d 1173 (Ala. 1983),
<br />two property owners challenged as arbitrary and capricious the
<br />city council's refusal to rezone their property from single-family
<br />residential to mulcifamily residential. The property owners
<br />contended that it was not practical or economically feasible to
<br />develop the property for single-family residential purposes and
<br />that they would suffer economic loss because the city council
<br />failed to rezone the property. The city council, on the other
<br />hand, argued that the property was usable and had value as
<br />presently zoned, even though it could more profitably be used
<br />under a different zoning classification.
<br />The property owners introduced a technical report that
<br />indicated that the lots would have to be sold at an unmarketable
<br />price to make development economically feasible. The city
<br />council countered with testimony of the city engineer, who
<br />challenged those figures. In addition, the city council introduced
<br />testimony of a land appraiser who had studied the property
<br />values in the area. The appraiser placed a fair market value of
<br />$25,900 on the property as zoned under the single-family
<br />zoning classification and a value of $158,025 if rezoned for
<br />multifamily residential use. The. appraiser admitted, however,
<br />that there was little demand for either single-family or
<br />multifamily residential lots in the city.
<br />The court ruled that the fact that the market for this type of
<br />housing might be depressed was not determinative. The court
<br />said its review was limited to whether the refusal to rezone the
<br />subject property was fairly debatable and one upon which
<br />reasonable people could be expected to differ. Applying the
<br />"fairly debatable" test, the court concluded that there was a
<br />fairly debatable question regarding the feasibility of developing
<br />the property according to the single-family residential use
<br />classification. The city council could properly base its denial on
<br />this question, said the coure.
<br />
<br />Public Need for Rezoning
<br />A rezoning may be justified if a substantial public need exists,
<br />and this is so even if the tract's private owner will also benefit.
<br />[See City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981).]
<br />Studies and plans of projected growth and development patterns
<br />may provide a substantial basis for a conclusion that there is a
<br />public need for certain types oflan~ uses. [See Luter v.
<br />Hammon, 529 So.2d 625 (Miss. 1988).J Likewise, rezonings
<br />may be necessary to keep pace with rapid development in areas
<br />identified in a long-range comprehensive plan. [See Bassani v.
<br />Board of County Commissioners for Yakima COUllty, 853 P.2d 945
<br />(Wash. App. 1993).]
<br />On the other hand, in the case of a zoning board's attempt to
<br />downzone a landowner's property to a more restrictive use, the
<br />zoning board must offer evidence that changed circumstances
<br />necessitate the rezoning to protect the public interest. [See Board
<br />of Supervisors of Hen rico County v. Fralin and Waldron, Inc., 278
<br />S.E.2d 859 (Va. 1981).]
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