Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/05/2003

Home

Page 8 -- May 10, 2003 7.8. 446 The use of the property preexisted the adoption of the city ordinance in 1979. Since the proposal did not call for the enlargement or extension of the driveway into the residential zone, the driveway would not be used any more than it had been previously. The court noted the citizens pointed to the possibility of increased traffic, but this alone did not constitute a greater use of the property. Citation: D~ffy. v. City of Dover, S~preme Court of New Hampshire, No. 2001-479 (2003). see also: Town of Seabrook v. Vachon Management, 745 A.2d t155 (2000). Appeals -- Company seeks to store septic tank sludge on property north of city Residents' appeal to commission is dismissed IDAHO (04/02/03) -- Caven, who owned Ace septic, applied for a condi- tional use permit from the county. He wanted to store and apply septic tank sludge on 80 acres of land located about 5 miles north of the city of Sandpoint. Residents living nearby formed a nonprofit association called County Resi- dents Against Pollution from Septic Sludge (CRAPSS). They appealed the planning and zoning commission's approval of the conditional use permit. The commissioners dismissed the appeal "for failure to state lawful grounds upon which the appeal can be based." CRAPSS asked the couiX for review and asked for the case to be remanded to the county commissioners on grounds they unlawfully dismissed the appeal. The court ganted.CRAPSS' request, and the county appealed. DECISION: Case remanded to commission. The county had to hear CRAPSS' appeal. The county commissioners had two options when considering appeals. First, it could dismiss the appeal for failure to state lawful grounds upon which the appeal could be based. Second, it could conduct a pubic hearing to gather addi- tional information. If it selected neither option within 30 days, it was required to conduct the public heating. In this case, the commission summarily dismissed the appeal, but did not state what was lacking in the notice of appeal and was unable to tell the court what was lacking. The notice of appeal clearly stated lawful grounds, includ~ Lng that the decision-was arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence. It listed 15 specific facts supporting the grounds for appeal. The county could not simply dismiss an appeal if it did not want to hear it. The summary dismissal deprived-CRAPSS of the right to a public hearing where it could present additional evidence. Citation: County Residents Again,~t Pollution From Septage Sludge (CtLz~PSS) v. Bonnet Co,mty, &~preme Court of idaho, No. 27765 (2003). see also: Sar~ders O~rhard v. Gem. County ex re. Board of Co,tory Commissioners, 52 P3d 840 (2002).