Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/05/2007

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Zoning Bulletin The ordinance stated, in relevant part, that land clearing required a per- mit or other approval from the city. Land clearing was defined as "direct or indirect removal of trees and/or land cover from any undevelopeci or par- tially developed lot, public lands or public right-of-way." After an arhorist assessed the value of the trees, a hearing was held. The hearing officer found that' Sleasman had violated the ordinance; he was fined $1,170. Sleasman appealed the hearing officer's decision and the fine to court. The court found that the ordinance in question was not unconstitutional- ly vague-the standard by which an ordinance could be found invalid-and upheld the hearing officer's decision. Sleasman appealed again. The appeals court affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that-under the ordi- nance-Sleasman had engaged unlawfully in land clearing because his prop- erty was "partially developed." Sleasman appealed to the state's supreme court, arguing that the appeals court had erred by agreeing with the city's interpretation of the ordinance, or, alternatively, that the ordinance was void because of its vagueness. DECISION: Reversed, The court found that the ordinance was unambiguous, but it also did not apply to Sleasman's property. Under the plain meaning of the language in the or- dinance, Sleasman's property was not "partially developed." Partially developed land was land that had been converted in part for commercial, residential, or some other use. Sleasman's land was developed, because it was a lawful building site and, indeed, contained a legal structure at the time of the tree removaL The city argued that land was only developed fully when no further improve- ments could be made, but the court disagreed. Land could be improved after development, but "one [could not] build or improve upon a lot unless it [was] developed." Sleasman was only able to improve upon his lot because it had been developed already, and, by definition, was therefore not subject to the ordinance. The court noted that the city and the lower courts had read the term "partially developed" so broadly that it included almost all property. If the city council had intended for the ordinance to have such an effect, it would not have added permit conditions for undeveloped or partially developed land; rather, it would have required a permit under all circumstances. Generally, courts gave deference to municipalities in zoning matters, and the city argued here that it deserved such treatment. Further, the city claimed that it had a pree..1Qsting policy o't interpreting the ordinance as it did in Sleasman's case, but it was unable to demonstrate a preexisting case. The only other time a fine was assessed under the ordinance using a similar defi- nition occurred after Sleasman was fined. Finally, because the court found that the ordinance did not apply to Sleas- man's property, it did not examine the ordinance for constitutionality. Gen- erally, courts prefer to resolve issues without reaching constitutional argu- ments whenever possible. Sleasman's property was developed, and, therefore, not subject to the or- dinance. The fine was revoked. See also: Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 807 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1991). See also: Vema u Commissioner of Revenue Services, 261 Conn. 102, 801 A.2d 769 (2002). 7 105