Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/03/2007

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Zoning Bulletin Because Jones could not satisfy the criteria for variance approval, the board had not abused its discretion by denying his application, and the trial court had not erred when it affirmed the board's decision. See also: Duncan v. Village of Middlefield, 23 Ohio St. 3d 83, 491 N.E.2d 692 (1986). See also: Wolstein v. Pepper Pike City Council, 156 Ohio App. 3d 20, 2004-0hio- 361,804 N.E.2d 75 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2004). Covenants - New landowner argues original covenants should no longer apply Town cites environmental concerns and refuses to waive covenants Citation: In re Hildebrand, 2007 VT 5,2007 WL 189326 (Vt. 2007) VERMONT (01/16/07) - Neill oVillled a large parcel of land in the tOVilll of Waitsfield. Neill applied to the planning commission to subdivide the land into four lots. Neill planned to sell lots 1,2, and 4, and keep lot 3. The lots were located on both srdes of a road in an area referred to as a "scenic corridor." After the commission and neighboring landowners raised concerns, includ- ing the disruption of an "important viewshed" and environmental concerns, several conditions were agreed upon. One condition included limiting part of lot 4 to agricultural fields that had to be maintained as open fields. The agree- ment also prohibited further subdivision of the lots Neill intended to sell. Neill sold lot 4 to Hildebrand in 1995. The deed included the covenants estab- lished by the original subdivision plan. Subsequently, howeveJ; Hildebrand sub- mitted an application to subdivide the land. She wanted to construct a single-fam- ily home on the part of the lot that was supposed to remain an open field area. The commission responded to the application by informing Hildebrand that, absent a significant change. or extenuating circumstances, it would not be inclined to override the covenant. Hildebrand then produced a letter from Neill, as the original landowner and existing neighboJ; stating no opposition to the development. In addition, Hildebrand contended that "times [had] changed," and there was no need for the restriction on development of the lot. The commission denied the application, stating that the proposed devel- opment violated the origillalland use created by the initial subdivision. Hil- debrand appealed to court, but the decision of the commission was affirmed. Hildebrand appealed again. Decision: Affirmed. On appeal, Hildebrand claimed that the lower court had erred by relying on inapplicable case law to reach its decision. Fur-theJ; she argued that she should be allowed to challenge the conditions of the subdivision permit, and she had proven adequately that the needs addressed by the original land use deciSion had changed. She claimed that the provisions mandating the use of her property were no longer necessary and urged flexibility in light of the fact that the neighboring landowners did not object to her proposed amendment. HoweveJ; the appeals court found no erroJ; and, therefore, no reason to dis- turb the decision of the lower court. There was a clear precedent favoring the finality of the decisions of administrative bodies in zoning disputes; there was a statute that articulated clearly the legislature's intent for zoning disputes to be limited to a "well-defined procedure ... [that] provide[d] finality at the end of the proceedings. " The lower court had noted that - while nothing expressly prohibited the introduction of an application to amend final subdivision permits - an en- 5 35