Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/03/2007

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April 1, 2007 I Volume 1 I No.7 from certain properties; under the new ordinance, the city sought to close Giovanni's business for being nonconforming. Giovanni responded to the city's claims by contending that the new ordinance violated its First and 14th Amendment rights. In addition, Giovanni asked the court to find that the city's interpretation of the or- dinance was incorrect. Ultimately, the court found in Giovanni's favor with regard to the latter argument. This finding essentially ended the case without the merits of the constitutional claims being heard. Giovanni returned to court seeking attorneys' fees. Decision: Request denied. Generally, each party to a lawsuit was responsible for its own attor- neys' fee unless there was a legal precedent that provided fees to the pre- vailing party. In cases involving a civil rights action, the Civil Rights At- torneys' Fees Act of 1976 (Act) gave courts the right to allow reasonable requests for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party at the court's discre- tion. Here, despite the fact that its constitutional civil rights arguments were not heard, Giovanni claimed that it was entitled to attorneys' fees under the Act. To decide this case, the court had to determine if Giovan- ni was considered a "prevailing" party in a legitimate civil rights claim for the purposes of the Act. A party was considered to have prevailed if he or she "receiv[ed] at least some relief on the merits of his [or her] claim." The court found that Giovanni had prevailed on one part of its claim-the legal interpre~ tation of the zoning ordinance, but the Act did not extend to this type of claim. However, a court could expand the application of the Act if a party claimed civil rights violations in addition and in relation to other types of claims. The court noted that "when the claim upon which a plaintiff actually prevails [was] accompanied by a 'substantial,' though undecided, [civil rights] claim arising from the same nucleus of facts, a fee award [was) appropriate." The U.S. Supreme Court had determined that "Con- gress did not intend to have [the provisions of the Act) extinguished by the fact that the case was settled or resolvea on a nonconstitutional ground." To determille if fees were appropriate, the court had to next decide if Giovanni's success on its statutory claim was tied sufficiently to its unheard civil rights claims. In this case, the nucleus of facts related to the constitutional claims were not the same as the facts used to determille judgment in Giovanni's favor on the legal question. At trial, Giovanni argued that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional, but it also argued that-if legal-the ordinance did not apply to its business because it existed as a legal, con- formillg use before the ordinance was amended. In other words, it was grandfathered under the old .ordinance. 7 45