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<br />January 1, 200? I Volume 1 I No.1 <br /> <br />Furthermore, the legislature granted local ZOru.L"lg boards the authority to regu- <br />late zoning, amend regulations, and provide for special exceptions. Specifically, <br />the statute established that plarining commission could "approve alt=ative de- <br />velopment standards through the granting of a waiver of standards." <br />Because the court found that neither of Kay's arguments had merit, the deci- <br />sion to deny his request for review was affirmed. <br /> <br />See also: Building and Canst. Trades Council of Northern Nevada v. State ex reI. <br />Public Works Bd., 108 Nev. 605, 836 P.2d 633,77 Ed. Law Rep. 508 (Nev. 1992). <br /> <br />Enforcement-City closes daycare under ordinance <br /> <br />requiring special exception for home business <br /> <br />Business owner claims city never enforced the ordinance <br /> <br />previously <br /> <br />Citation: Ex parte Squires, - So.2d -, 2006 WL 3462149 (Ala. 2006) <br /> <br />ALABAlvL\ (12/01l06)-After consulting the 'city planner and zoning code en- <br />forcement officer, Squires obtained a business license to operate a daycare facility <br />out of her home in Saraland. Under an ordinance, home businesses were. allowed <br />-with a special exception permit. <br /> <br />Squires did not apply for a special exception until after being cited by the city <br />for excessive trame, noise, and garbage as a result of operating the daycare from <br />her home. The zoning board held a meeting to hear her application, and it decided <br />against granting Squires a special exception. <br />The zoning enforcement officer, Platt, stated that the city had never actually en- <br />forced the relevant ordinance, noting that other licensed daycares and home busi- <br />nesses were operating at the same time as Squires'-in her same neighborhood, <br />even-without special exceptions. <br />Squires sued the city and the board, arguing that denying her the special excep- <br />tion was selective enforcement-a constitutional violation. She claimed that the <br />board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and had unla",-fully denied her the <br />opportunity to run her business. <br />The court found in favor of the city, and Squires appealed. The appeals court <br />stated that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to decide on the constitution- <br />ality of the zoning ordinance, because Squires had not served the attorney general <br />-with a copy of their appeal as was mandated by a state law. <br />Squires appealed again. <br /> <br />Decision: Reversed and returned to the lower court for furcher proceedings. <br /> <br />The supreme court of Alabama had determined in a previous case that there <br />was a difference between challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance and <br />challenging the lawfulness of its enforcement. The law upon which the appeals <br />COUL"1: relied in dismissing Squires' case required that the attorney general be given <br />notice of any proceediTlg in which a "statute, ordinance, or franchise [was] alleged <br />to be unconstitutional." <br /> <br />Here, the court found that the central question was whether the enforcement <br />of the ordinance, aL'1d not the ordinance itself, was discriminatory. Squires was not <br />required to serve notice on this type of claim. Because the appeals court affirmed <br />the trial court's decision without considering whether the city was guilty of selec- <br />tive enforcement, the case was returned to that court for further discussion on <br />that issue. <br /> <br />5 <br /> <br />149 <br />