Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/07/2007

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April 15, 2007 I Volume 1 I No.8 of the code delegating authority to the zoning administrator to make certain zoning decisions. Patton argued that, here, any decision by the zoning administrator regarding the construction of the neighbor's deck would exceed his authority, because state law prohibited this kind of delegation. Taken together, Patton argued that there was not sufficient due process available for residents to challenge zoning decisions. Patton's complaint listed the neighbor, his contractor, and the city as defendants, but, before the case proceeded to trial, he reached an agree- ment with the neighbor and contractor. However, he continued with his claims against the city with regard to the zoning code. The trial court dismissed the case, finding that Patton failed to show any actual contro- versy or harm. Patton appealed. Decision: Affirmed. The appeals court agreed with the findings of the lower court. First, the section pertaining to filing complaints did not necessarily have any- thing to do with the section of the code regarding variance requests- where Patton got the specific language that he argued was erroneously omitted. Second, the challenge to the zoning administrator's authority was irrelevant, because the zoning administrator had not approved the construction in this case. Furthermore, the appeals court agreed with the lower court that Pat- ton had failed to demonstrate actual present harm or the significant pos- sibility of future harm-a requisite for his case to be allowed to proceed. Case law mandated that, where an out-of-court settlement was reached that terminated the initial controversy being litigated, the moving party no longer had standi.t''"lg to bring his or her complaints before the court. Patton argued that" [w ]hen an ordinance exist [ ed] which permit[ ted] modification of property rights without due process of law, all citizens affected by that ordinance live[d] with the significant possibility of fu- ture harm," and therefore had standing to bring the claim. The court was not persuaded by this argument, noting that there was no "person- al, substa..l1tial, at''1d adverse affect that was different in character from that sustained by the public generally." To have standing to challenge a zoning ordinance, a parry' had to be able to demonstrate that he or she was personally affected or harmed. Generally, courts did not approach constitutional arguments if it was not necessary. Here, because the appeals court found that the constitu- tionality of the code could not be challenged without evidence of actual harm, the case was dismissed. See also: Fourroux v. City of Shepherdsville, 148 S. W,3d 303 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). See also: King v. City of Corbin, 535 S. W,2d 85 (Ky. 1976). 7 171