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<br />Zoning Bulletin <br /> <br />and unusual punishment, and due process clauses of the First, Fifth, <br />Eighth, and 14th Amendments, respectively. Knauss also alleged state <br />constitutional violations. <br />The city asked for the case to be dismissed. <br /> <br />Decision: Request granted. <br /> <br />A judgment ror dismissal was appropriate if the nonmoving party <br />could state no claim upon which relief could be granted. The city <br />claimed further that dismissal was appropriate because Knauss did <br />not have standing to bring his claims. <br />With regard to standing, Knauss had to show that: 1) there was <br />an actual or imminent injqry that was "concrete and particularized"; <br />2) the injury was reasonably related to the city's actions (in other <br />words, the enforcement of the ordinances); and 3) it was likely that <br />the injury would be redressed by a decision in his ravor. In addition; <br />federal courts have adopted the premise that an individual alleging <br />constitutional violations "must assert his [or her] own legal rights <br />and interests and cannot rest his [or her] claims on the legal interests <br />of third parties." <br />The court found that Knauss did not have standing on any claim <br />except for the freedom of religion claim. Most of his claims related <br />to the way the ordinances affected the homeless population, and, as <br />he was not homeless himself, he could not show that the ordinances <br />caUse him an injury personally. <br />With regard to his freedom of religion argument, Knauss alleged <br />that charity work was an essential part of exercising his religion and <br />that the ordinances prevented him from doing so. However, if an or- <br />dinance oDly "incidentally burdened" the freedom of religion, "it <br />passe[d] constitutional muster uDless the law [was] not rationally re- <br />lated to a legitimate public interest." Because there were other chari- <br />table work opportunities that were not affected by the ordinance, the <br />court found that this principle applied. <br />The court further found that the ordinances were applied neutrally <br />and generally to religious and nonreligious organizations, and they <br />served a legitimate public interest-the assurance of compatibility of <br />uses within a certain zoning district. The COULL stated that a city had <br />"strong interests iel maintaining the integrity of its zoning scheme and <br />in protecting its neighborhoods." <br />Because the ordinances were equally applied, served a government <br />interest, and oDly irifringed incidentally on Knauss' freedom of reli- <br />gion, the court found them to be constitutionally sound. <br /> <br />8 <br /> <br />166 <br />